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Anew category of institutional investor has enteredthe world of alternative investments: the Japanesecorporate pension plan. Long discouraged from
entering the field due to domestic government regula-
tions and other factors, since the late 1990s a growing
number of such plans have made financial commitments
to one or more categories of alternative investments. 
Despite the increasing significance of this phenome-
non, the lack of reliable information on relevant trends
and the potential impacts of these alternative investments
have raised a number of important questions. For exam-
ple, precisely how many Japanese corporate pension
plans have invested in alternative assets, and what is the
value of these investments? Which investment styles do
these plans favor or avoid, and why? What are likely
future trends in these Japanese plans’ commitments to
alternative assets? And how does participation in alterna-
tives by Japanese corporate pension plans, now and in
the future, compare with their U.S. and other Western
counterparts?
To address these and related questions, the Center
on Japanese Economy and Business at Columbia Business
School and the Pension Fund Association of Japan (PFA)
co-organized a conference that brought together leading
representatives of North American and Japanese pension
plans. The meeting, held in Tokyo in February 2004,
attracted a capacity audience of more than 450 people
drawn largely from the Japanese pension community
and received financial support from 43 Japanese and
non-Japanese financial institutions. Hiroshi Tada, presi-
dent of the PFA, and Yuzaburo Mogi, president and 
CEO of Kikkoman Corporation and trustee emeritus of
Columbia University, offered introductory remarks.
The conference was then organized into four speeches
and three panels. The first speech, by Yasuchika Asaoka
of the PFA, set the overall context by defining the field
of alternative investments and specifying a number of
key topics the conference would examine. The PFA’s
Akihiro Nakamura then presented a summary and analysis
of an original PFA pension plan member survey, created
jointly by the PFA and the Program on Alternative
Investments, regarding their current and expected future
allocations to alternatives. Mark Mason of Columbia
Business School followed with a comparison of evolving
U.S. and Japanese corporate pension plan participation
in alternatives in the context of the two countries’ over-
all investments in the alternatives field by their respec-
tive groups of tax-exempt institutions.
The audience then heard from speakers organized
into three panels considering each of three major alter-
native investment categories, followed by the concluding
keynote address. The first panel, on private equity, was
moderated by Masakazu Arikawa of Sony and featured
presentations by Gregory Williamson of BP America and
Shuzo Takahashi of the PFA. The second panel, on hedge
funds, was moderated by Mark Mason and was based
on talks by Yoshihide Furuya of the Japan Computer
Information Services Employees’ Fund and Francesco
Mainolfi of the World Bank. The third panel, on real
estate alternatives, was moderated by Noboru Yamaguchi
of the JTB Pension Fund and featured presentations by
Leo de Bever of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan and
Hidekazu Ishida of Osaka Gas. Finally, N. P. Narvekar 
of the Columbia Investment Management Company dis-
cussed the role of alternative investments in the context
of his organization’s broader investment portfolio.
What follows is the English version of the confer-
ence transcript. As always, the Program welcomes com-
ments from interested readers.
Mark Mason, Ph.D.
Director
The Program on Alternative Investments
Center on Japanese Economy and Business
Columbia Business School
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MASAKAZU ARIKAWA
Masakazu Arikawa is an Executive Board Member of 
the Sony Pension Fund, President and Representative
Director of Sony Global Management Corporation, and
General Director of the Pension Planning Department of
Sony Corporation. Prior to these positions he was Chief
Executive Officer of Sony Global Treasury Services from
2000 to 2003.
Mr. Arikawa graduated from the Faculty of Economics
of Hitotsubashi University in 1969 and joined the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry. He began his career
with Sony Corporation in 1974 and became President of
Sony Overseas SA in 1986. In 1990 Mr. Arikawa became
General Manager of the General Planning and Investment
Planning Department and in 1995 Director-General and
Executive Board Member of Sony Pension Fund, where
he still serves in those capacities. He also has served as
outside board member of Sony Life Insurance Corporation,
Sony Finance Corporation, and Monex Inc.
YASUCHIKA ASAOKA
Yasuchika Asaoka is Executive Director of the Pension
Fund Association of Japan (PFA). Prior to joining the 
PFA in 2001, Mr. Asaoka worked for Nomura Research
Institute (NRI), beginning in 1972. In 1983 he was Chief
Researcher of NRI, and in 1986 worked at its New York
office. In 1988 he returned to Tokyo and was General
Manager of the Mathematical Research on Bond
Division, and Head of the Nomura Pension Management
Research Group. Mr. Asaoka was Director of the System
Science Division from 1989 to 1994, Director of the
Planning Division from 1994 to 1996, and in 1996 he
became Executive and Director of Information Resources
of the Human Resources Division and Manager of the
Planning Division. In 1997 he was named Executive and
Director of the Asset Management System Division of
NRI. In 2000 he became Director of the Knowledge
Solution Sector and of the Financial Knowledge Solution
Division.
Mr. Asaoka is coauthor of Saiken Unyo to Toushi
Senryaku (Institute for Financial Affairs, Inc., 1981) 
and Shin Saiken Unyo to Toushi Senryaku (Institute for
Financial Affairs, Inc., 1991).
LEO DE BEVER, Ph.D.
Leo de Bever is a Senior Vice President at the Ontario
Teachers’ Pension Plan Board, which administers the
retirement plan for 250,000 Ontario teachers. His depart-
ment is responsible for the Fund’s risk management, 
tactical asset allocation, and economic research. The
group also manages the Fund’s real return and infra-
structure assets. Dr. de Bever began his career at the
Bank of Canada in Ottawa in 1975. In 1980 he started
an economic consulting firm for Chase Bank in Toronto.
From there he moved into asset management, first at
Crown Life and then at Nomura Securities. He joined
Teachers’ in 1995. He received his Ph.D. in Economics
from the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
YOSHIHIDE FURUYA
Yoshihide Furuya is an officer at the Japan Computer
Information Service Employees’ Pension Fund. He attends
investment seminars and is engaged in a wide range 
of research. He has been working on implementing a
fundamental review of investment trust forms and estab-
lishing its effectiveness in the management structure.
In 1987, after graduating from the Faculty of Business
of Senshu University, Mr. Furuya joined JJK (Zenkoku
Jouhou Service Sangyo Kousei Nenkin Kikin) and worked
in Sales and Marketing in the Entitlement Division and the
New Enrollment Business Development Division. In 1997,
he was made responsible for General Management of
Investment. In 2003, he joined the Corporate Pension
Investment Research Group in the Research Institute for
Policies on Pension and Aging.
HIDEKAZU ISHIDA
Hidekazu Ishida is an Investment Officer of Osaka Gas.
He joined Osaka Gas Company in 1990 after graduating
from the Faculty of Law of Tokyo University. In 1995, 
he received an MBA from Stanford University and
returned to the Finance Department of Osaka Gas. 
In this position he worked in funding, risk management,
investor relations, and pension asset investment. In 2000
Mr. Ishida headed the Tax Qualified Pension Investment.
In 2003 he assisted in the translation of Pioneering
Portfolio Management as a member of Jisedai Nenkin
Jitsumuka Network. Mr. Ishida is a charter member of
the Security Analysts Association of Japan, CMA.
FRANCESCO MAINOLFI , Ph.D.
Dr. Francesco Mainolfi is a Principal Investment Officer
at the World Bank Pension Fund in Washington, D.C.,
where he leads the hedge fund investment team. He is
responsible for managing all aspects of the World Bank’s
$1.5 billion hedge fund portfolio. In this capacity, he
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oversees asset allocation, hedge fund due diligence and
manager selection, portfolio construction, risk manage-
ment, and monitoring. Dr. Mainolfi joined the World
Bank in October 2002 and subsequently developed the
Bank’s current hedge fund investment allocation and
portfolio construction methodologies as well as the port-
folio performance and risk monitoring platforms.
Prior to joining the World Bank, Dr. Mainolfi was
responsible for alternative investment strategies at the
Treasury Group of HVB Americas (Hypovereinsbank) 
in New York. At HVB, Dr. Mainolfi served on the invest-
ment committee and was responsible for quantitative
modeling, research and strategy development for HVB’s
proprietary investments in hedge funds.
Before working at HVB, Dr. Mainolfi was Assistant
Professor of Finance at DePaul University in Chicago,
where he focused on investment management and finan-
cial derivatives. Prior to joining DePaul, Dr. Mainolfi was
an adjunct professor of finance at the Graduate School
of Business at Columbia University. Dr. Mainolfi received
his Ph.D. in Finance from Columbia University in 1999
and holds undergraduate and graduate degrees from
York University and the University of Toronto.
MARK MASON, Ph.D.
Dr. Mason is Director of the Program on Alternative
Investments at the Center on Japanese Economy and
Business, Columbia Business School. In this capacity, 
he directs a range of research projects that examine the
emergence of hedge funds, private equity and other
alternative asset classes in Japan and the development 
of Japanese institutional investments in alternative assets
both in Japan and abroad. In addition, he oversees an
active series of seminars, symposia and conferences that
examine alternative investments together with regular
presentations by distinguished speakers from the busi-
ness, government, and academic communities. 
Prior to his current position at Columbia, Dr. Mason
was a tenured professor of international business at
Georgetown University, and before that a professor at
the School of Management, Yale University. In addition
to his academic activities, Dr. Mason advises institutional
investors on alternative investing. He is the author of
American Multinationals and Japan (Harvard University
Press) and Europe and the Japanese Challenge (Oxford
University Press), as well as numerous articles in leading
business and management journals. Dr. Mason has been
widely quoted in publications such as Business Week,
The Economist, The Financial Times, The New York
Times and The Wall Street Journal. He holds a Ph.D.
from Harvard University.
YUZABURO MOGI  
Yuzaburo Mogi became President and Chief Executive
Officer of Kikkoman Corporation in February 1995.
Kikkoman, the world’s largest producer of soy sauce,
opened its first U.S. plant in Walworth, Wisconsin, in
1973, and its second U.S. plant in Folsom, California, in
1998. A plant was opened in the Netherlands in 1997
and in China in 2002. Kikkoman also has plants in
Singapore and Taiwan. Mr. Mogi first joined Kikkoman
in 1958 after graduating from Keio University, Tokyo. 
He received his M.B.A. from Columbia Business School
in 1961. He became a member of Kikkoman’s board of
directors in 1979, Managing Director in 1982, Executive
Managing Director in 1989, and Executive Vice President
in 1994.
From 1994 to 2000, Mr. Mogi served as a Trustee 
of Columbia University, and in October 2000 he was
appointed Trustee Emeritus. He also was Vice Chairman
of Keizai Doyukai (the Japan Association of Corporate
Executives) from 1995 to April 2003. In 1996, he became
a member of the Council of the World Economic Forum.
In 2002, he became the Japanese chairman of the
German-Japanese Forum, and in 2003 he became the
Japanese chairman of the Japan-Midwest U.S. Association. 
Since 1987, Mr. Mogi has been honorary ambassa-
dor of the State of Wisconsin to Japan in recognition of
his role in establishing Kikkoman’s first U.S. plant there
and in promoting friendly community and state relations.
He was a 1998 recipient of the Harry Edmonds Award
given by International House of New York. In 2003, 
Mr. Mogi was awarded the royal decoration Officer in
the Order of Orange Nassau by Queen Beatrix of the
Netherlands. Mr. Mogi is the author of several books,
including How to Make an Overseas Plant; Introduction
to International Business; The Day Shoyu Made It to
America’s Tables: The Export of Food Culture; and
Overseas Strategies Without Friction.
AKIHIRO NAKAMURA
Akihiro Nakamura has been Chief of the Investment
Research Department of the Pension Fund Association 
of Japan since 2000. He joined the Pension Fund
Association in 1987 and from 1991 to 1993 worked in
the Pension Bureau of the Health, Labor, and Welfare
Ministry and the Pension Management Division. In
October 1996, Mr. Nakamura became Portfolio Manager
of the Pension Management Division. In 1999 he joined
the Japan Center for Economic Research.
Mr. Nakamura is a member of the Security Analysts
Association of Japan. He was named by Pensions and
Investments magazine as one of “25 to Watch in Finance”
in its October 1998 25th anniversary issue. His publica-
tions include Kakei no Kinyu Shisan Sentaku to Shisan
Haibun (Household Financial Asset Selection and Asset
Distribution, Japan Center for Economic Research) and
Kinyu Fukyo no Jissyo Bunseki (Positive Analysis on
Financial Depression, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Inc.)
N.  P.  NARVEKAR
N. P. (“Narv”) Narvekar became the President, CEO, and
CIO of Columbia Investment Management Company in
July 2002, where he now oversees Columbia University’s
$4 billion endowment and its investment team of 16.
From July 1998 to July 2002, he was Managing Director
of Investments at the University of Pennsylvania. During
his tenure there, his responsibilities were to build Penn’s
presence in the hedge fund and private equity arenas.
He also worked closely with the CIO of Penn to build
the investment team. Prior to joining the University of
Pennsylvania, Mr. Narvekar spent his entire 14-year Wall
Street career at JP Morgan, where he was a Managing
Director responsible for teams dedicated to marketing
structured equity derivative products for both corporate
and high net worth clients. Earlier, he was in JP Morgan’s
Private Placements Group, marketing structured debt
issuance to corporate clients and distributing it to investor
clients. Mr. Narvekar has an M.B.A. from Wharton,
which he received while working at JP Morgan. He is 
a graduate of Haverford College.
HIROSHI  TADA
Hiroshi Tada has been President of the Pension Fund
Association of Japan since 1999. After graduating from
the Faculty of Law of Tokyo University, he joined the
Health and Welfare Ministry in 1962. In 1988 he became
Director of the Health for Elderly Division of the Health
Care Bureau. From 1989 until 1992 Mr. Tada was Chief
Counselor of the Cabinet Counselor’s Office, Cabinet
Secretariat, and Director of the General Affairs Division,
Minister’s Secretariat.
Other positions Mr. Tada held in the Health and
Welfare Ministry were Director, War Victims’ Relief Bureau,
January 1992; Director-General, Minister’s Secretariat, July
1992; Director, Health Insurance Bureau in 1993; Vice
Minister of the Health and Welfare Ministry from 1994 until
1996; and Special Adviser to the Minister of Health and
Welfare from 1996 until 1997. In February 1997 Mr. Tada
became President of the Seamen’s Insurance Foundation. 
SHUZO TAKAHASHI  
Shuzo Takahashi is part of the Equity Investment Team
of the Pension Investment Department of the Pension
Fund Association of Japan. He is mainly responsible for
monitoring external entrusted investment funds. He has
been involved in launching the PFA’s alternative invest-
ments, which began in 2000.
In 1995, Mr. Takahashi graduated from the School of
Education of Waseda University and joined the Pension
Fund Association in the Operations Department and the
Investment Research Department. In 1999, he worked in
the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Bureau of Social
Insurance Guidance and in 2000 moved to the Pension
Management Division.
GREGORY T.  WILL IAMSON
Gregory T. (Greg) Williamson is the senior investment
manager for the Trust Investments Group of BP America
Inc. ($15 billion in assets). Mr. Williamson has specific
responsibilities for the Group’s overall investment strate-
gies and activities and external manager analysis and
review. He is a member of Trust Investment’s aggregate
fund, domestic investment, alternative investment and
portfolio management and risk control teams and serves
as secretary of the BP America Inc. Investment Committee.
Mr. Williamson is also a member of BP Canada’s Investment
Committee and directs BP’s effort to develop global pen-
sion management and financial risk management capa-
bilities. He is a member of the advisory boards of sever-
al external organizations, including Castle Harlan Inc.,
Fenway Partners, Inc., the Woodside Fund and the
Clemente Capital Korea Fund. Mr. Williamson is an
Investment Risk Alert Advisory Board member and a
member of the Risk Standards Working Group. Mr.
Williamson is also a founding board member of the
Chicago Quantitative Alliance and is a member of the
Institute for Quantitative Research. He coauthored
Alpha: The Positive Side of Risk (Investors Press, 1997)
and was named by Pensions and Investments magazine
as one of “25 to Watch in Finance” in its October 1998
25th anniversary issue.
Prior to his current position, Mr. Williamson was
President and CEO of Alphatech Investment Management
Company, which he formed after serving as President of
Springfield Asset Management in Chicago. Before joining
Amoco, Mr. Williamson was Vice President of investment
banking at Northern Finance and had previously held
positions with O’Connor and Associates in its proprietary
trading and strategic planning groups, with F. P. Quinn
and Co. as Director of Risk Arbitrage, and with Peterson
and Co. in its strategic consulting and investment bank-
ing groups. 
Mr. Williamson received a B.A. in Economics from
Northwestern University with honors, and an M.M. in
Finance and Strategy through the 3/2 honors program
from the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management
at Northwestern University. 
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NOBORU YAMAGUCHI
Noboru Yamaguchi has been Executive Vice Chairman
and CIO of JTB Pension Fund since 2003. In 1966 he
graduated from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and
joined the Japan Travel Bureau (JTB). He worked in the
New York and London offices for more than 11 years.
From 1997 to 2003, Mr. Yamaguchi was General
Executive of the JTB Pension Fund.
At the Pension Fund Association of Japan, his posi-
tions included fiduciary responsibility working team
leader (1999), Chairman of asset investment committee
(2000–2001) and Commissioner of risk management
research group (2000–2001). Currently, he is a chairman
of the system reform committee, Chairman of the Year
2004 reform special committee, Commissioner of PFA
asset investment, Chairman of future training business
discussion group, a member of corporate governance
forum steering committee and Chairman of the Tokyo
district council. He has been Chairman of Corporate
Pension Network since 2002. He also oversaw the
hybrid plan research network (2002) and corporate pen-
sion system research network (2003). 
TOMOMI YANO
Tomomi Yano is Executive Managing Director of the
Pension Fund Association of Japan. Prior to joining the
PFA in this role in July 2001, Mr. Yano had an extensive
and successful career with the Health and Welfare
Ministry. He was Director of the Planning and
Development Division of the Pension Fund Association
from 1981 to 1992, Manager of the Planning Division of
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau from 1992 to 1994,
Manager of the General Affairs Division from 1994 to
1995, Counselor of the Minister’s Secretariat in charge of
pensions from 1995 to 1996, and Director of the Pension
Bureau from 1996 to 2001.
HIROSHI  TADA
President of the Pension Fund 
Association of Japan
It goes without saying that in the
past few years, we have seen a
strong crosswind blowing toward
pension asset investment. You have
had to make extreme efforts to improve investment 
performance, but it seems that the Japanese economy 
is showing signs of firming, and with your support, 
revision of the law toward better corporate pension
plans is starting. At last, we are starting to see a strong
tailwind behind program reform and the investment
environment, but we cannot be complacent. We must
continue to work hard to gain better investment results
for pension funds. Capital markets are undergoing 
major transformations, and that means that there will be
increased choices available to us all. We have to expand
our horizons to the new investment techniques and
investment fields, beyond the current investment frame-
work such as bonds and stocks, both in Japan and
abroad. There is no magic wand in asset investment;
each of us faces a different situation in our pension
funds. We need to identify the essence of this new
world and pursue the best investment methods for each
pension fund. We cannot follow others blindly—that
could lead to major errors. 
We will be hearing firsthand views on alternative
investments by pension funds. There is no single 
solution. The reason we have called this gathering a
conference and not a seminar is because we wanted this
to be an active occasion for exchanges of views. We
hope you find this program worthwhile and it helps you
in your day-to-day pension fund management. I would
like to thank all of you who made this event possible
and who have supported us in the holding of this con-
ference. Thank you very much.
YUZABURO MOGI
Trustee Emeritus, Columbia University;
President and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation
As you know, employee pension
funds have been hindered by recent
difficulties in the economy. Pension
funds are positioned as a major
investor group in the equity market, and pension invest-
ment management has had, and still has, a major impact
on corporate performance. With prolonged poor per-
formance in the equity markets and extremely low inter-
est rates, we anticipate low investment returns in the
interim period. Many 
corporate pension funds are experiencing underfunding,
and although most recently we have seen some
improvement (and experts say this difficult situation is
finally coming to an end), the situation is quite difficult
in terms of investment returns to pension funds. Given
this situation, expansion of investment and improve-
ments in the efficient management of pension assets are
very important. This leads me to the topic we are gath-
ered here to discuss. That is, many pension funds are
now considering allocations to alternative investments.
From the point of view of improving investment, partic-
ularly with regard to managing risk, we need to diversi-
fy, but there are different types of vehicles available. It’s
important that we assess and compare the nature of
each carefully. 
We have experts from each area of investment to
give us a detailed explanation of exactly that—the
nature of the different forms of alternative investment.
We can expect diversification as an important effect of
alternative investments, but at the same time, this will
require heightened risk management. We are in a very
difficult investment era, and we hope you find this con-
ference worthwhile in leading you to a better under-
standing of alternative investment vehicles.
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YASUCHIKA ASAOKA
Executive Director, Pension Investment,
Pension Fund Association of Japan
Why the interest in alternative assets
now? For one, the Japanese stock
market has been quite weak, and 
as a result many pension funds are
experiencing underfunding. This is a global phenome-
non, but it is particularly the case in Japan, so that is
one motivation for the interest. Market volatility has also
increased, and therefore market risks in the short term
have become larger. We also have new accounting stan-
dards and as a result the performance of pension funds
affects the plan sponsor’s accounts significantly. At the
same time, in global capital markets and economies, it is
difficult to expect continued high rates of growth in the
future. The world’s capital markets are changing rapidly,
and financial technologies have advanced. New vehicles,
new investment methodologies, and new technologies
are now available. We need to invest under these new
circumstances, and in Japan nearly all the old regula-
tions have been removed in pension fund management.
It is now up to the pension funds and plans themselves
to invest in the way that suits them, meaning that more
efficient and effective pension fund investment has
become extremely important. Last year, there was a
report in the Financial Analysts Journal that argued that
in order to capture added value, one couldn’t simply 
rely on the capabilities and skills of fund managers;
however, it is better to place the least constraints on
management. This emerged as a sensational report 
and was accepted as an “eye-opening” sort of stimulus.
This recognition has pushed forward expansion in the
interest in alternative investment, both in the U.S. and
Japan. 
There is no clear single definition, no clear catego-
rization of alternative investments. We might say that
this is an asset class that is outside traditional public
equity or bond asset classes. Methods of investment dif-
fer from traditional methods. Many strategies are called
alternative investments, but we might highlight the fol-
lowing common characteristics that are in contrast to the
traditional modes of investing: limited liquidity; difficulty
obtaining market evaluation with few good benchmarks
for referencing performance; less information disclosure;
considerable disparity in investment performance (much
of which is not necessarily good); high fees; and, in
many cases, debt financing is used to push up leverage,
which of course could produce potentially higher
returns but at higher risk. 
There are many kinds of alternative investments,
but I would like to highlight three types: private equity
investment, hedge fund investment, and real estate-related
investment products. Here’s a bird’s-eye view of the
positioning of three types of alternative investments 
in relation to the traditional core investment, which 
consists of stocks and bonds, the sort of investment in
which you keep a long buy and hold and when the
need arises, you sell investable grade bonds. Public
equity has been another core investment vehicle in 
traditional investing. Foreign exchange has also become
an investment vehicle. Long hedges, short hedges,
sometimes futures and also real estate (particularly in
the form of real estate trusts), shorting of currency and
stock and bond futures are also vehicles used to hold
short positions. These are nontraditional vehicles, but
when you talk about fixed income, it is not limited to
investable, high grade; you also have speculative grades
and structured products like asset-backed bonds.
Equities are not just public equities; there is a consider-
able range of private equities. There are futures in secu-
rities, but you can also use futures in commodities and
they are traded. Gold is, of course, a commodity in
which you can invest directly. Real estate is not limited
to real estate trusts; there are other real estate-related
products that are offered in wide variety these days. Oil
development projects are also possible candidates for
investment. You are now seeing expansion into these
alternative vehicles, even in the short position. We have
more investment vehicles available to us, and that
requires us to be more efficient in tapping the potential
of these new vehicles. 
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Where is private equity going to be positioned in
this overall picture of the investable universe? I think,
mainly in the equity area, but it is also in investing in
private equities and some low-grade bonds and some
projects, too. 
What about hedge funds? In general, hedge funds do
not invest in real estate, but they invest in everything
else. 
What about real estate investing? Anything that is related
to real estate can be regarded as investment, and com-
pany-type listed vehicles are now available in relation to
real estate (and there are other types included), but in
terms of alternative investment, the motivation is the
same in that you really want to tap into as many possi-
ble vehicles as possible. 
Private equity, hedge funds, and real estate would be
the focus areas. Private equity is a method of investing
in privately-held companies. Particularly in Japan, ven-
ture capital, leveraged buy-outs, and mezzanine are the
leading types utilized currently in the area of private
equity. In terms of investment vehicles, partnerships,
single-fund partnerships, partnership kinds of funds, 
and secondary trading in funds are done. 
Private Equity
In private equities, the time frame is defined at the
beginning. The end of the investment period is predeter-
mined, and the life period of the fund is predetermined.
The amount of the investment is also predetermined.
The amount of the commitment is clarified at the begin-
ning. Of course, you don’t pay the commitment amount
at one time; you pay in as capital is called for, because
when the manager identifies the investments, they call
on you to pay in that committed amount. Whether there
is going to be a capital call or not could also be consid-
ered one of the specific features of private equity. There
is a J-curve effect to realization of returns. When it is
realized, you get a receipt of the realized returns, but
these are not really coming back to you overnight. You
have to wait at least a couple of years before you can
reap the benefits of your investments. Compared to listed
equity, the private equity market is less efficient, and
liquidity tends to be smaller. So, once you buy into this
position, it is very difficult for you to exit in a very short
period of time. You have to be prepared to be in for 
the long haul. It is very important to have considerable
commitment on the part of the fund manager; the
“hands-on” approach is needed to realize the improved
value of the investment. 
With regard to the types of funds, the tokumeiku-
miai anonymous cooperative is most common here in
Japan. Here, the general partner has unlimited responsi-
bility and a limited partner has limited responsibility.
Pension plans usually become limited partners, not gen-
eral partners. You can invest in all phases of private
companies; the important thing is how to truly realize
returns. You need an “exit strategy.” You do the initial
public offering or merger and acquisition, and as you look
at this exit portion, depending on the situation of the stock
market, there would be a major impact of how success-
ful you would be in implementing your exit strategy. 
Hedge Funds
There are a variety of definitions for hedge fund invest-
ments. I like the definition used by Frank Russell and
Goldman Sachs: “A skill-based investment strategy that
generally involves the use of leverage and/or short sell-
ing, and a fee that is based on performance” (Goldman
Sachs International and Russell Investment Group Report
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on Alternative Investing, 2003). One key point here is
that this investment strategy is based on skill. The ineffi-
ciencies of the market must be identified and utilized,
and short positioning is permitted. This is very critical
for hedge funds. There are also many hedge funds that
seek absolute return. It also seems that the investment
strategy and style cannot persist for long, and in many
cases, there may be some limitation in the size of assets
being managed. What is different from traditional invest-
ment? 
The traditional active fund management of equities actu-
ally does the same thing, buy low and sell high. The
basics are the same. Even if this were a hedge fund,
there would be risks. There seems to be some differ-
ence in that hedge funds are short selling, and the sub-
ject of the investment includes an investment in deriva-
tive securities other than the underlying securities.
Perhaps one of the major advantages of hedge funds is
that short selling and investing in derivative securities
take place.
Real Estate
With regard to real estate-related investment, in Japan,
unfortunately, the practice had been to invest directly
into real estate or REIT. Until now, those were the only
two possibilities in investing in real estate-related prod-
ucts. With the amendment of Japanese law, new real
estate-related products have been launched. The key
word in real estate now is securitization. The separation
of ownership and management is taking place, and this
is being done to alleviate the burden on real estate
owners. These are new developments in Japan. Several
types of management funds have come to the fore. One
is J-REIT. It is expanding quite rapidly. Another is the
private real estate fund. The core type, which is high-
quality real estate mainly backed up by rents, is now
popular. Some value is added on top of the core real
estate asset, too, and that is regarded as the noncore
fund. There are also smaller-sized products that are 
now included in our objective investment in the world
of real estate-related products. 
There are several major characteristics of real estate-
related products. First, the size of the market is quite
large. Another point is that there is the duality of debt
and securities instruments. Does this mean we are to
focus on rental income or the appreciation of value?
There is a difference. Unfortunately, liquidity in the 
market is still relatively low, even for J-REITs. Nor is the
volume of transactions for J-REITs in Japan very large,
and often leveraging is used with the use of nonrecourse
loans. The issues with valuation are something we have
to think about. We also need to verify conflicts of inter-
est, both in funds and in J-REITs. The real estate owner
is the one who would acquire the real estate, and the
fund manager is responsible for the management of our
investment. However, the investor, the asset manager,
and the real estate manager, these stakeholders, have 
a very intimate relationship in many cases, especially
when they belong to the same group. Also, the financial
institutions that offer leverage would have some rela-
tionship with the group company, so our basic assump-
tion is that we have confirmed conflicts of interest. From
the point of view of fiduciary responsibility, this must be
fully taken into account before deciding to invest in real
estate-related products. 
About This Conference
There are several questions I would like to ask the
speakers to try to address today. How should we think
about the strategic asset mix and how do we treat alter-
native investment? Should alternative investment be 
considered a new asset class? Often people talk about
pursuit of absolute return, but is it possible to secure
absolute return? If it is possible, is that true for all alter-
native asset classes? How should we recognize alterna-
tive investments, from the point of debt of the pension
plan or level of its maturity? In selecting a fund manger,
is the approach different from the traditional investment
strategy? How are we to measure performance? Is it true
there is no benchmark we can refer to? It is said that 
in many asset classes of alternative investments, liquidity
is low. Does that make it very difficult to exit from the
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investment contract? How can we confirm the method of
cancellation beforehand? With regard to traditional active
investment, depending on the asset class, the asset size
of the investment and the expected excess return seem
to show disproportionate linkages. How does this work
out in alternative investments? What precautions should
we exercise in terms of risk management? How do we
ensure proper fiduciary responsibility on the part of
fund managers? How do we recognize appropriate valu-
ation and avoid the scandals inappropriate valuation has
led to in the hedge fund industry? GIPS was introduced
in January 2004 for fair valuation, but still, many other
methods of valuation are utilized and GIPS may not be
sufficient. In December 2005 there will be fair valuation
in real estate, but the minimum requirement here is
once every three years and this seems insufficient. How
do we obtain information on the market value of real
estate funds? These are likely to be some points that will
be taken up by the speakers during this conference. 
The conference is divided into two sessions. The
first session assesses the status quo of Japanese and U.S.
pension funds, how they are involved in alternative
investments, and the differences between Japan and the
United States. The second session is composed of three
panel discussions. First, from the perspective of both the
United States and Japan, in each of the asset classes of
alternative investments, a presentation will be given by
the plan sponsors who actually invested in these assets.
They discuss the good and the bad points, taking into
account the results of the analysis carried out in this
pension fund survey. Finally, we have a keynote closing
speech to wrap up the points discussed in this conference.
AKIHIRO NAKAMURA
Chief, Investment Research
Department, Pension Fund Association,
Japan
I will discuss the Japanese alterna-
tive investment situation for pension
funds based on two surveys, both
of which took place toward the end of March 2003. 
The first set of surveys was done on pension funds. 
We received responses from 1580 pension plans and the
response rate was 95.4%. The other was a survey done
on managers. We received responses from 109 managers,
which covers 99% of pension funds assets contracted. 
Japanese Corporate Pension Funds in Alternative
Investments
Let me begin by telling you about the fund size. As of
the end of March last year, 583 billion yen of alternative
investment made against 4.8 trillion yen, so the percent-
age was 1.3% of gross asset management by all pension
funds. Approximately 80% of allocation into alternative
investment vehicles was in hedge funds. 
One hundred and twenty-one funds allocated, and this is
less than 10% of all funds. This is not much, but about
twice as many as are currently allocating are considering
the possibility, so there is a high level of interest toward
alternative investments by pension funds. 
Ninety percent of the pension plans allocating in
alternative vehicles are investing in hedge funds. Of
course, some funds invest in a multiple number of alter-
native vehicles. Let me give you a three-year trend of
funds now allocating; looking at the situation starting
from the end of 2000, we are seeing a gradual increase.
A majority of the increments come from increases in
hedge fund investment, pushing up the overall alterna-
tive investments by pension funds. 
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Looking at allocated alternative investment products
based upon the questionnaire survey conducted of man-
agers by percentage in product type, direct investment
in specific funds came to about 50% of the investment;
37.2% of the investment went into fund of funds. By
country, domestic as well as yen-denominated invest-
ments accounted for 48%; 32% of investments went into
U.S. or dollar-based funds and 13% into European funds. 
By style of hedge fund investment, long-short, including
market neutral, came to 46%. Multiple fund of funds,
including multiple styles, amounted to 37%, but the
majority of fund of funds are long-short or market neu-
tral in the case of Japan, which means that the majority
of alternative investments made by Japanese pension
funds are in hedge funds of market-neutral style. 
Those who are actually allocating or considering
allocating were asked about how their decisions relate
to asset size. The larger the pension funds, relatively
speaking, the more likely they are to invest in alterna-
tive investments. The tendency is the same among 
those considering allocations. If you focus on the largest
group, those of 200 billion yen or more, if you add
those considering and committed, it amounts to more
than 90%, which means that the largest pension funds
are actually allocating or considering allocating into
alternative investment vehicles. 
With regard to the types of pension funds, about
10% of the allied companies pension funds of affiliated
companies are allocating. Those who are considering
the most are multiple-company pension funds. 
Looking at the relationship between maturity of pension
fund and alternative investment, (maturity is defined by
benefits and other outlays divided by contributions and
other revenues; contributions alone are not enough to
pay benefits), in the case of allied company pension
funds, those who are relatively low in maturity tend to
invest in alternatives. Among multiple-company pension
funds, you can see that higher maturity pension funds
tend to invest more in alternatives. 
Similarly, for those considering alternative investments,
the tendency is more or less the same as before. 
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Looking at the relationship between alternative
investment and asset allocation, as of the end of March
of last year, we examined, on the horizontal side, the
ratio between domestic versus foreign equities and, 
vertically, the ratio of bonds plus general accounts. 
The chart shows the overall distribution of all the pen-
sion funds studied. Green shows the average. Using that
average as base, if you draw a line vertically, all of the
funds on the right-hand side show pension funds with
higher than average equity proportion, and if you draw
a horizontal line from the average, everything below
means funds have higher than average risky assets,
because this is looking at bonds and general account
ratios. The higher you go, the lower the risky asset,
which means that below this line funds have higher
than average risky assets. You can use the two green
lines to arrive at the quadrants. The first quadrant shows
funds that have higher than average equity, but have
low-risk assets. In other words, convertible bonds and
other risk assets are not invested in, although they have
higher equity. All in all, we have lower risky assets. Left
top is the second quadrant. This shows relatively a low
risk asset funds, so asset allocation approach taken by
these plans are not into risky assets. The third quadrant
has low equity ratio, but foreign-denominated bonds
and convertible bonds are being invested in heavily,
which means that the risk is higher. The fourth quadrant
shows a high equity ratio and a high risky-asset ratio.
We can use average fund as a base to arrive at the four
quadrants in terms of asset allocation and alternative
investing. We would like to look at each one in terms of
different investment vehicles. 
Looking at the ratio of bonds and the general
account ratio of domestic and foreign equities as seen
from hedge funds, there is considerable variability, but
we can use the same quadrant.
The fourth quadrant shows that hedge fund investment
is higher for those companies that invest more in equities
and take higher risks. If you look at those considering
allocation, you can see that the right lower quadrant
pension funds tend to consider more. We are also 
seeing more funds considering investment. They are
clustered in the middle. Those who are close to the
average means asset allocation is more or less average.
Those who are considering tend to have average asset
allocation mix. 
Moving on to private equity, the sample in this case
is quite small. 
Of those pension funds now allocating to private equity,
most of them are now in the fourth quadrant. If you
increase the area slightly, you can see that almost all of
the pension funds now investing in private equity are 
in the right, lower right. In other words, those pensions
who take greater risks and who invest in equities tend
to invest in private equity. You can see that of those
who are now considering, 38.7% belong to the fourth
quadrant. 
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Lastly, with respect to real estate products, again, 
looking at the right lower quadrant, those pension funds
having greater risk assets tend to be the ones investing
in real estate products. If you include those considering
investment, you can see that three-quarters of the funds
now allocating in real estate products belong to this
group. Looking at the pension funds considering, again,
many are in the fourth quadrant, but we see a shift
toward the mean. Thus far, I have tried to show you the
relationship between asset mix and allocation in summary
for hedge fund, private equity, and real estate products. 
Pension funds with higher risk-asset ratio tend to be
involved more. 
Let’s examine the relationship of risk vs. return. 
Looking at the converted annual returns for the last
three years from 2000 to 2003, the mean fund average is
shown by green. Unfortunately, in the past three years,
equity markets have not done well in Japan, or else-
where, and so we have a downward sloping situation.
Those who took risks tended to do poorly. If you use
the fund average to draw vertical and horizontal lines,
anything right of the vertical line shows pensions with
higher than average risk. Everything below the horizon-
tal line means pensions with lower than average returns.
Again, we can use four-quadrant analysis. The first
quadrant is high risk, high return. The second quadrant
is low risk, high return. The third quadrant is low risk,
low return. The fourth quadrant is high risk, low return. 
This is the risk-return relationship for those invest-
ing in hedge funds: the fourth quadrant has the highest
proportion, and this has high correlation with the asset
allocation relationship in the quadrants earlier. As a
result, these pension funds ended up in high risk, low
return. The funds that are considering investment are
more or less included in the fourth quadrant. So far, I
have looked at asset allocation and the risk-return rela-
tionship, and these pension funds belong to more or
less the same quadrant. However, the pension funds
may be able to assume a higher level of risk and thus
may have decided to invest in alternative asset classes.
Alternately, perhaps due to the low level of returns in
the past several years, they have decided to pursue
higher returns, thus deciding to invest in these alterna-
tive asset classes. From this survey alone, we cannot
analyze the entire situation and the reason for being
committed to the alternative investment, but this appears
to be the status quo. 
What about the allocation ratios in alternative
investments? 
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A 3–5% allocation ratio is carried out by 31.4% of the
pension funds. The average is 5.7%. Horizontally, the
sizes of the pension funds are given in a logarithmic
scale, so that as you go to the right, the pension funds
would be larger in size (this chart shows the distribution).
Vertically, one can see the allocation ratio of alternative
investments. There is some variance here, but it seems
that those pension funds toward the left show higher
levels of allocation in alternative investments as an over-
all trend. If the asset size is less than 10 billion yen, 9.5%
is the average allocation ratio to alternative investment.
About 2.8% of the pension funds that have a size of 200
billion yen or more are allocating their assets in alternative
investment. The larger the size of the pension fund, the
greater the amount being invested, and this is growing. 
Investment Objectives and Concerns
The pension funds that have decided to invest and those
considering investment have four basic reasons that inform
their decisions. We asked the pension funds to select the
two top reasons, which is why if you add up all these
numbers, it doesn’t reach 100%. “Absolute returns to be
expected” and “diversification of the investment” are the
two major reasons cited by the pension funds for investing
in hedge funds. For private equity and real estate-related
products, the greatest reason cited was “long-term total
returns,” so depending on the type of asset class, there
were different reasons cited. About 20% of pension funds
said they would be able to limit their risk. This includes
both the pension funds that were considering the possibili-
ty of investment and those who have already committed.
When limited to those now considering alternatives,
the greatest reason cited was “diversification.” In the
past several years, performance was not very clear, so
by having further diversification in the asset classes in
which they are investing, some fund managers say that
the return is improving. This may be improving the
mindset of the pension funds in going for alternative
investments. Quite a few pension funds actually consid-
ering the possibility say that the risk may be limited, 
and the ratio of those pension funds citing limited risk
as a reason is higher for those who are considering
compared to the already-committed pension funds. 
What are the major differences in motivation between
the already-committed pension funds and pension funds
that are considering? Absolute returns are expected by
pension funds in the second and the fourth quadrants.
Recall the chart discussed earlier; the second quadrant 
in terms of the asset allocation is characterized by the
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relatively low level of risk assets, whereas the fourth
quadrant features a high level of risk assets, mainly
investing in equities. These two types of pension funds
show a stark contrast, but both expect high absolute
returns. This is quite interesting. Limiting our analysis to
pension funds that belong to the second quadrant, the
risk asset is low, which means that under the low inter-
est rate environment, they cannot really pursue high
returns. Perhaps, as an alternative to investment in fixed
income, they have decided to invest in the alternative
asset classes. Others belonging to the fourth quadrant,
as a result of pursuing their investment strategy, ended
up with a relatively low return and thus may have
decided to invest in alternative classes, rather than in
equities. Limited risk was cited by those belonging to
the third and the fourth quadrants, and the characteris-
tics of these pension funds are that they have relatively
high levels of risk assets and so they now want to limit
their levels of risk. 
Let’s look at maturity and risk and the reasons cited
for investing in alternative investments as the expectation
of high absolute returns. For pension funds with a matu-
rity of 100% or more and as a result of assuming a rela-
tively high level of risk, the past three years’ perform-
ance was not very good. These would be those belong-
ing to the fourth quadrant. They are actually pursuing
those absolute returns by deciding to invest in alterna-
tive investments. For those who have actually invested
in hedge funds, the sample size is quite limited. Only
eight funds belong to the fourth quadrant. All pursue
absolute returns. The brackets show those pension
funds that are considering investing. 
With respect to the evaluation of alternative invest-
ments, about 30% of the funds said that it was “as they
have expected” and about 10% said the result was “not
as expected.” 
Since the history in Japan of alternative investments is
very limited, more than 50% of the funds said they are
unable to reach a determination as of now. From the
United States and Canada, we have representatives of
pension plans who have a longer history of alternative
investment. It would be very enlightening if they could
share with us their impression of whether their gains
were more than they had expected originally in invest-
ing in alternative investment or whether the results were
below their expectation levels. 
Summary
Alternative investments are not yet prevalent among
Japanese pension funds, but more than double the 
current number of pension funds are actually consider-
ing the possibility of investment, and expectations of
absolute returns and limiting risk are cited as the major
reasons pension funds are contemplating investing in
hedge funds. Although I did not discuss details, the 
dedicated managers in larger pension funds are great 
in number, and the larger pension funds have contracts
with consulting companies. Thus, it may be said that
these larger size pension funds have a system or an
institutional framework in place that would allow them
to be exposed to alternative investments. Also, the 
multicompany type pension funds with high maturity
had greater exposure to alternative investments.
Pensions who take risks, too, tend to have greater 
exposure to alternative investments. 
When it comes to pension funds that are currently
considering the possibility of making investments in
alternative asset classes, these are average pension funds
in terms of the asset allocation. The smaller the size of
the pension, the greater the allocation ratio for alterna-
tive investments. Of course, the performance of alterna-
tive investments would have greater impact on those
smaller size pensions because the amounts being invest-
ed in alternative investments would be a greater propor-
tion of the entire portfolio. In order for larger pension
funds to increase their allocation ratios, they would have
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to start investing in larger funds. However, the conse-
quent cost of management or evaluation would become
significant. This may suggest that it is quite difficult for
the larger pension funds to increase the allocation ratio
for alternative investments because the fund size is at
the moment quite limited. However, expectations are
heightening in Japan with regard to the performance and
the significance of alternative investments. Many expect
diversification as a result of investing in alternative asset
classes. Thank you very much.
MARK MASON
Director, Program on Alternative
Investments, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business, Columbia
Business School 
The topic of today’s conference, of
course, is U.S. and Japanese corpo-
rate pension fund participation in alternative investments.
As we explore this important subject, we might want to
keep in mind a few basic facts about the development
of alternative assets more generally. First, many kinds 
of investments that today we call “alternative” are in 
fact very old and therefore, in some sense, “traditional,”
including investments in real estate, timber, gold and 
so forth. Even private equity, strictly speaking, has been
around for centuries, for prior to the advent of public
exchanges, virtually all investments in business enter-
prises were purchases of privately held shares because
there were no public markets for the exchange of shares.
Second, there have been, at the same time, enor-
mous changes in recent decades that have virtually rede-
fined the alternative investments field. More complex
and sophisticated methods have been devised to facili-
tate investments into and exits from a broader range of
private equity and real estate opportunities. Hedge
funds—first developed in the United States just after
World War II—have grown in terms of assets under
management, investment styles, management structures,
and otherwise. And the range of investors has expanded
and now includes high net worth individuals, family
offices, banks, insurance companies, public and private
pension funds, foundations, endowments, and others. 
Third, what is in its modern form largely a Western
field of investing is now being more widely adopted 
by individuals and institutions on other key parts of the
globe—including, of course, Japan. 
I have divided my presentation into three main
parts. In the first part, I focus on U.S. corporate pension
funds in alternative investments—examining these pen-
sion funds’ current alternative investment allocations and
strategies; investment goals, concerns, and methods; per-
formance, at least as measured by the subjective level of
satisfaction; and expected future alternative strategies. In
the second part, I compare U.S. with Japanese corporate
pension funds in alternatives by identifying seven appar-
ent similarities between the U.S. and Japanese experiences
and 10 apparent differences between pension funds
based in these two countries. Finally, in the third part, 
I try to briefly place the U.S. and Japanese corporate
pension fund experiences into still broader international
perspective. 
One final note: The information I am providing
here is by intention descriptive, rather than prescriptive.
I will try to give you balanced, reliable information
about this subject rather than tell you how you ought to
act based on that information, because I think our first
task here this afternoon is to gain a clear understanding
of the facts about the complex and rapidly developing
field of alternative investments. To provide as compre-
hensive yet detailed a picture of our topic as possible, 
I have drawn on two sets of original data. One data set
is based on original survey work we conducted at
Columbia Business School during the fourth quarter of
last year—that is, October through December of 2003.
This survey posed a range of questions about alternative
investment allocations, strategies, and methodologies rel-
evant to the corporate pension fund community. We
identified and contacted the 100 largest U.S. corporate
pension funds as ranked by reported assets under man-
agement (AUM) and have so far obtained a substantial
but still incomplete response rate. Our work continues.
At this stage in our research, we therefore cannot pro-
vide a conclusive set of findings, but based on our
experience so far we believe the information that we
have collected may provide a number of valuable
insights into our broader conference topic. 
In addition to the Columbia data for the U.S., I have,
of course, drawn on the survey of Japanese corporate
pension funds conducted by the kosei nenkin kikin ren-
gokai and that Mr. Nakamura has just so ably described.
Finally, to supplement the Columbia Business School
data for the United States and to provide still broader
international perspective, I have drawn on extensive
research conducted by Greenwich Associates together
with two charts contained in a 2003 report by Goldman
Sachs International and the Russell Investment Group. 
U.S. Corporate Pension Plans in Alternative
Investments
What is the current level of U.S. corporate pension fund
investment in alternative assets? Of the U.S. corporate pen-
sion funds that responded to the Columbia survey,
roughly 75% reported that they participated in alterna-
tive investments of one category or another. Their aver-
age AUM stood at US$5.6 billion with an average alloca-
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tion of 10.6% and an AUM weighted average allocation of
10.3%. 
The broader universe of U.S. corporate pension
funds surveyed by Greenwich Associates and shown on
the following chart is consistent with the Columbia find-
ings for large pension plans, but provides at least two
additional factors helpful to understanding the broader
U.S. situation because there are many, many pension
funds in the United States, as there are in Japan, which
are not so large. First, the average proportional alloca-
tion of U.S. pension funds in alternatives increases with
fund size. I am talking about assets actually invested.
Second, U.S. corporate pension funds overall currently
have far more invested in real estate (roughly 3.7%) and
private equity (3.6%) of their total investments, than they
do in hedge funds—which are currently estimated as of
last year at just 1.3%. 
To provide a broader context for the U.S. situation, 
I thought the audience might also be interested in the
relative participation of different categories of U.S. tax-
exempt institutional investors in alternative assets. The
key point I would like to make here is that endowments
and foundations are the tax-exempt alternative leaders
by average proportional allocation, followed by public
pension funds and, last, corporate pension funds.
Indeed, U.S. endowments and foundations apparently
allocate, on average, more than two times the propor-
tion of assets under management to alternatives as do
U.S. public or private pension funds. The difference is
far more striking if we just compare the allocations in
hedge funds, where endowments and foundations have
been extremely aggressive. 
An obvious question is: why are endowments and
foundations so relatively active in this field? There is no
conclusive study on this topic to date, but some of the
most probable reasons include the following. First, U.S.
corporate pension funds are generally governed by ERISA,
which sets the so-called “prudent person” investment stan-
dard—in effect, do not stray from relevant accepted prac-
tice. So, they are generally not the first to invest in and
enter into new investment fields such as hedge funds and
other alternative products. (I might add, by the way, that
many U.S. public pension funds have also adopted this
prudent person standard on their own initiative.)
Foundations and endowments, however, are not con-
strained by this ERISA standard. 
Second, the boards of U.S. corporate pension funds
are made up largely of corporate officers, whereas the
boards of U.S. endowments and foundations often are
largely composed of wealthy, entrepreneurial people—
many of whom have backgrounds in financial services and
personal experience investing in alternatives. Endowment
and foundation board members, in general, have therefore
been much more understanding and indeed supportive of
alternative investments than have their corporate pension
fund counterparts. 
Third, it appears that the managers of some of the
leading U.S. endowments, such as Harvard University, who
are in effect the opinion leaders in the endowment com-
munity in the alternative investments field, are today far
more highly incentivized financially than are their U.S. cor-
porate pension fund manager counterparts to seek new
ways to maximize performance, which they have tried to
accomplish in part through the creative use of alternative
investing. 
What are the leading investment objectives and con-
cerns of U.S. corporate pension funds in alternative assets?
Let’s briefly summarize the Columbia findings by asset
class. For private equity, the leading objectives are expect-
ed total returns (first) and diversification (second). The
leading concerns are lack of liquidity, lack of private equity
expertise at the pension fund, and legal structure of the
potential investment. For hedge funds, the Columbia sur-
vey suggests that the leading objectives are diversification
and expected total return and the leading concerns, on the
other hand, are lack of transparency and volatility. Finally,
for real estate in the United States, the leading objectives of
the pension funds are diversification and expected total
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returns and the leading concerns, paradoxically, are poor
anticipated returns and, quite naturally, lack of liquidity. 
Given the current level of interest in hedge funds, I
thought it would also be useful to include a simple graph
showing what investment structures U.S. pension funds
favored when putting money into hedge funds. As you can
see, according to Greenwich Associates, roughly 5% of U.S.
corporate pension plans allocated to single managers, and
about 7% allocated to funds of hedge funds, as of 2003.
Continuing with our consideration of investment method,
we then asked the U.S. plans how they chose alternative
investment fund managers. In our survey, they told us that
in-house research staff and gatekeepers or funds of funds
were the most often used groups. When we asked them
whether they have dismissed managers whose funds they
had already invested in, more than 25% told us they had
dismissed at least one manager in the alternatives field. We
next asked the U.S. plans who performed the internal
management of the alternative assets once purchased, and
they told us that general and dedicated pension staff,
rather than treasury staff or senior executives and so forth,
were the people responsible. 
To gain some understanding of performance, we
inquired about the U.S. plans’ level of satisfaction with
their alternative investments. The vast majority told us their
investments performed “as expected,” and after that, the
second most common response was “above expectation.” 
How do U.S. corporate pension plans expect to
change their allocations in the future? Alternative invest-
ments are the only investment category where the average
respondent plan expects to significantly increase alloca-
tions—to hedge funds (first), private equity (second), and
real estate (third). 
U.S. vs. Japanese Corporate Pension Plans in
Alternatives
Next, I would like to briefly summarize the major simi-
larities and differences I found when comparing U.S.
and Japanese corporate pension funds in alternative
investments. Starting with similarities, one clear point in
common is that in recent years, both U.S. and Japanese
corporate pension funds have substantially increased
their participation in alternatives. Second, it appears that
U.S. and Japanese plans both identified diversification as
the chief investment objective of their hedge fund
investments. Third, both countries’ plans point to diver-
sification as the main objective of their investments in
real estate. Fourth, U.S. and Japanese plans both point
to lack of liquidity as the chief investment concern of
their participation in private equity. Fifth, the U.S. and
Japan both identified lack of transparency as the key
investment concern when placing money into hedge
funds. Sixth, there is at least some evidence to suggest
that both U.S. and Japanese corporate pension plans
are more likely to invest in hedge funds through funds
of funds vehicles than through single manager invest-
ment vehicles, although frankly this is a topic of
research that requires more work. The seventh, and
final, similarity I would like to point out is that both
the U.S. and Japanese corporate pension fund commu-
nities expect to substantially increase their allocations
to alternative investments. It is also worth pointing out
that the U.S. and much of the Japanese pension plan
community seem to anticipate making their largest rela-
tive alternative increases in hedge funds. The Japanese
data from plans now considering investing in alterna-
tives points to this, and virtually all of the data I have
found for the United States tells this same story. 
Why, I am often asked, are U.S. corporate pension
plans so enthusiastic about hedge funds? I think there
are at least three main reasons. First, U.S. plans are
looking for new investment options, following a number
of disappointing and, frankly, often volatile years in the
public markets. Second, some hedge funds apparently
have different risk-return profiles than the traditional
asset classes and in such cases may act as a helpful
diversifier in shifting out the efficient frontier. Third, the
proliferation of hedge funds has created greater supply
(or capacity) and a large number of hedge fund product
types in which U.S. corporate pension funds can invest.
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What are the differences between U.S. and Japanese
corporate pension plans? For one, allocations into alter-
natives by U.S. corporate pension plans substantially
exceed their Japanese counterparts, both relatively and
absolutely. I suppose it is important to point out in this
regard, of course, that only in recent years have changed
Japanese government regulations made it relatively easy
to invest in various alternative products.
A second notable difference relates to specific alter-
native asset preferences. As I indicated before, in the
U.S. there has been a strong bias, at least up until now,
for investing in real estate and private equity, whereas in
Japan, there has been a clear preference for hedge funds.
Having said that, however, there now appears to be 
a major shift under way in the U.S. to substantially
increase relative allocations to hedge funds. Indeed, the
historical data alone suggests that the average allocation
to hedge funds by U.S. corporate pension funds as a
proportion of total allocations to alternatives stood at
just 4% in 2001, but it increased to 15% by 2003. This is
indeed an important, ongoing shift in the United States. 
Third, there is a striking contrast between the
United States and Japan concerning the relationship
between fund size and alternative allocation. In the U.S.,
the larger the pension plan, on average the greater the
proportional allocation into alternatives—whereas in
Japan, on average the smaller the pension plan, generally
the greater the proportional allocation. Here, I am talk-
ing about Japanese pension plans that have actually
invested in alternatives, rather than about plans that are
considering investment in the future. The more limited
participation by large Japanese plans may be related to 
a reported lack of adequate capacity in quality hedge
fund products in Japan in favored styles, such as market
neutral, but that is pure speculation. 
Fourth, the chief objective of U.S. pension plans in pri-
vate equity appears to be expected total returns, whereas for
their Japanese counterparts it appears to be diversification. 
Fifth, the chief investment concern of U.S. pension
plans in real estate appears to be poor anticipated returns,
whereas for their Japanese counterparts it is lack of trans-
parency. 
Sixth, after in-house staff, the U.S. pension plans
rely heavily on gatekeepers and funds of funds to help
them with manager selection, whereas the Japanese
plans, together with in-house staff, rely heavily upon
traditional investment managers to aid in the alternative
manager selection process. This is an important point of
differentiation between U.S. and Japanese financial inter-
mediation and one that will certainly require further study
and analysis. 
Seventh, whereas more than a quarter of the sur-
veyed U.S. pension plans had dismissed at least one
alternative manager they had already invested in, a mere
9% of their Japanese plan counterparts had done so.
This is just a guess, but I would imagine this is related
to the relatively shorter amount of time that Japanese
plans have participated in the alternative investments
field. 
Eighth, with respect to hedge fund investment
strategies, there is at least some evidence to suggest 
that U.S. plans tend to invest in a relatively diversified
range of hedge fund styles, whereas their Japanese
counterparts appear to concentrate their hedge fund
investments into a relatively small number of hedge
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fund strategies, especially market-neutral and long-short
styles. I think this is a very important distinction. 
Ninth, and this will probably come as no surprise to
anyone here, given the different lengths of experience
of the U.S. and Japanese pension communities in the
field, the U.S. plans report their investment satisfaction
in alternatives as “as expected” or “above expectation,”
whereas the Japanese plans, quite naturally, hold it is
either “too soon to tell,” or “as expected.” 
The tenth and final difference I would like to point
out relates to the broader context of tax-exempt institu-
tions in both countries. In the United States, corporate
pension funds, as previously suggested, rank as the low-
est alternative allocators among that country’s tax-
exempt institutions, whereas in Japan, corporate pension
funds at least appear to rank as the highest alternatives
allocators among Japan’s tax-exempt institutions. It is
indeed my understanding that in Japan only a handful
of endowments and foundations together have invested
only relatively small amounts in alternatives, and that
public pension funds are only now beginning to seriously
consider such investments. 
U.S. and Japanese Corporate Pension Plans in
International Perspective
In this last part of my presentation, briefly, I will try to
place the U.S. and Japanese experiences in broader
international perspective by including the United
Kingdom and Continental Europe into our larger picture.
Together with the United States and Japan, the United
Kingdom and Continental Europe also manage large 
corporate pension funds as measured by AUM. When
we include these other locations in our analysis, one
point that clearly emerges is that Japan is something of
an outlier in terms of the relative proportions of assets
its plans have invested in alternative investments as
compared not only to the United States, but also to
Continental Europe and the United Kingdom as well. As
you can see from the following chart, in 2002 roughly
8% of U.S. corporate pension assets were invested in
alternatives. In the UK, the figure stood at 6.6%, in
Continental Europe the proportion was roughly 11.7%—
but in Japan it totaled just 1.4%. 
When we take a closer look at the alternative asset
mixes of corporate pension plans based in each of these
locations by alternative investment category, we find
that most Western alternative investments to date have
been made in real estate and private equity, whereas the
Japanese community so far has favored hedge funds in
relative terms. 
Finally, I will touch on the future of corporate pen-
sion fund participation in alternative investments: Based
on the kosei nenkin kikin rengokai data previously pre-
sented, it appears that Japanese corporate pension funds
not only plan to increase their alternative investments in
general, but, at least for many among them, to continue
to focus on opportunities in hedge funds in particular.
Based on the data presented in this slide, it appears that
Western investors also plan to continue growing their
alternative investments in general and, with the excep-
tion of the UK, Western corporate pension fund man-
agers are also focusing their interest on increased alloca-
tions to hedge funds. 
Summary
In concluding, allow me to make three simple summary
points. First, U.S. corporate pension plans’ participation
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in alternatives is significant and growing with a current
bias for real estate and private equity, but an increasing
interest in hedge funds. Second, the U.S. and Japanese
corporate pension plans share a number of common
views and experiences, but also exhibit a significant
number of differences, including the greater overall level
of U.S. participation in alternatives, the different kinds of
financial intermediaries engaged in the investment
process, and the contrasting positions of the U.S. and
Japanese plans within the broader tax-exempt context of
each respective country. Third, the current growth of
corporate pension plan investments in alternative assets
is not limited to the United States and Japan, but is
rather part of a far broader, international phenomenon. 
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MODERATOR:
MASAKAZU ARIKAWA
President and Representative Director,
Sony Global Pension Management
Corporation
Thank you very much. I am
Arikawa, Representative Director for
the Sony pension fund. We will shortly be going into the
panel discussions. I would first like to ask each of the
panelists to speak 20 minutes and present the slides
they have prepared. We have received many questions
and I would like the proceedings to move forward by
having you respond by summarizing these questions. 
I would like to allocate 35 minutes for Q&A. I would
like to ask each panelist to introduce himself and please
observe the 20-minute time limit.
SHUZO TAKAHASHI
Pension Investment Department,
Pension Fund Association of Japan
Beginning in the fall of 2002, the
Japan Pension Fund Association
started investing in private equity. 
I would like to explain the rationale
for our decision to do so. Our assets under management
amount to more than seven trillion yen at the moment.
The portfolio includes both Japanese and foreign bonds
and Japanese and foreign equities, but as the assets
under management grew, we began exploring options
outside these four asset classes and the potential for
new investment strategies into alternative investments. 
It took us about two and a half years to make the final
decision to go for private equities.  
Why should we invest in private equity? It is impor-
tant to have a clear objective when investing in these
alternative asset classes. We have two major objectives.
The first is to pursue a relatively higher rate of return and
better performance. The second is to diversify our port-
folio. The key phrase for both objectives is “long term.”
Looking at the commonly used historical net return aver-
ages for private equity provided by Thompson Venture
Economics, one can see, looking at data going back one
and three years from June 2003, the returns are negative.
However, as you look at a longer time horizon, a period
of 10 years to 20 years, the average return stabilizes at
about 14%. The rows at the bottom of the table show
the returns for S&P500 and NASDAQ for this period. In
comparison, private equity shows a higher return, but this
can also be taken as no real difference. However, in the
case of private equities, it is misleading to look at the
averages. What I mean by that is that there is great dis-
parity among fund managers in terms of rate of return
compared to other asset classes. This was also emphasized
in an earlier conference, but due to market inefficiencies,
this is an area where the manager’s skill dictates all.  
The year a fund is established is called the vintage
year. When one ranks the performance of the top quar-
tile, middle 50%, and lower quartile managers’ returns,
there are great disparities in performance between the
top quartile and the bottom quartile of managers, as
well as between the top and the middle quartile of man-
agers. This asymmetric performance pattern is also evi-
dent within ventures and buyouts and is especially
noticeable in venture capital. As with private equity, the
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PART II :  CURRENT ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 
IN JAPAN AND THE U.S.  BY ASSET CLASS
Panel 1: Private Equity
key to success lies in selecting a top-class fund manager
that performs with the top 25%. Moreover, once an
investment is made, it is very difficult to exit, making
good manager selection even more crucial. It is also
interesting to note that there is a high disparity in returns
among venture capital and buyout by vintage year. This
signifies the importance of diversification of the portfolio,
a point that I would like to come back to later on. 
The vintage years 1999 and 2000 show negative
returns; as mentioned by Mr. Asaoka, they have only
just begun investing. This is at the bottom of the J-curve.
I won’t have time to elaborate on this J-curve effect, but
I would like to state that there is an expectation of high-
er rates of return in investing in private equity, but it
takes time. That is what you have to bear in mind.  
One idea was to break down the liabilities into long
and short term. By breaking them up, we thought we
could see high- and low-risk tolerances. Using the end
of March 2002 as a base point, we carried out this analy-
sis on private equity. Calculations showed 40% of liabili-
ties scheduled distributions to begin in 30 years.
Therefore, at least for this group, an extended period of
30 years was targeted, so liquidity in the short term was
sacrificed in order to obtain the upside in the long term.  
I believe the basis for decisions on investment in
private equity rests on the ability to organize and man-
age this analysis. The other objective of investment in
private equity is portfolio diversification. With regard to
this objective, we classify private equity as a “stock alter-
native.” The correlation factor between private equity
and publicly traded stock differs according to the
method of calculation and timeframe, but is compara-
tively high at 0.6. One cannot say there is no relation-
ship between the performance of publicly traded mar-
kets and profitability of private equity funds, so there is
a tendency for a high correlation factor. It is likely the
IT bubble and venture capital especially accentuated this
tendency. However, there is a difference in the time
horizon for realizing profit, so one cannot say there is
no disparity just by looking at correlation factors.
There is also the J-curve effect, so it would not be
prudent to expect diversification from other assets from
the start. Also, diversification has another meaning. That
is, you can broaden the choices for equity investment.
Revenue for pensions, whether it be equity or debt,
comes mainly from the normal business activities of 
corporations. Considering the life cycle of companies 
we had only invested in, the listed stocks—the publicly
traded equities—were the only side of the formula that
we focused upon, since it offers liquidity and other
investment-worthy characteristics, but is also mature.
However, we would like to capitalize on greater growth
through the birth of new companies or liens on high
growth. There may be some improvement of the 
management structure or revitalization that can also 
be considered as investment opportunities. These are
the opportunities we want to target and felt we should
target. This process also boils down to diversification
and is a big reason why PFA decided to begin private
equity investment. 
There is a major difference between privately- and
publicly-traded equities beyond the stage in the life cycle.
That is, private equity allows a “hands-on” approach—
the opportunities are available for the investor to be
involved in the management of the firm. The existence
of such opportunities not available in other asset classes
would also be another form of portfolio diversification.  
All the above should contribute to the birth and
growth of new companies and enterprises, which would
lead to further expansion and growth of the economy as
a whole. This, in turn, would increase the return of the
private equity investment, expand the investment uni-
verse, and create foundations for future revenue sources.  
This is more or less a secondary effect, but invest-
ment leads to greater emphasis on corporate gover-
nance. This is an important perspective.  
So far, I have touched upon the philosophy and the
basic concept of PFA, and now I would like to be more
specific. Concerning the investment scheme of PFA, I
mentioned it is crucial to choose top-class funds.
However, the question remains as to how to go about
investing in such funds. Moreover, when starting out, it
is important to construct the core of the portfolio to be
as diversified as possible.
We have just begun with private equity investment,
so the know-how of selecting the funds and the accessi-
bility to top-class funds, which only cater to favored cus-
tomers, is quite limited. In this situation, it made sense to
leave it in the hands of the professionals, and we started
with a fund of funds as the investment trust vehicle.
There are advantages and disadvantages of fund of
funds. The know-how of fund selection, accessibility,
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and the analysis capability should be ensured, and we
would diversify our portfolio efficiently. In addition,
through a fund of funds, the monitoring of each fund as
well as governance can be left in the hands of the fund
of funds manager. There is much to be gained for an
investor that lacks experience in this area.
Of course there are disadvantages, such as the 
fees that would have to be paid to the fund of funds
manager, as well as to the fund directly, which means
that the net return would deteriorate to a certain extent.
However, as an investor that is only starting out, we
considered this an unavoidable cost. This does not
mean, however, that the advantages of fund of funds
can always be enjoyed. In recent years the number of
fund of funds has been on the rise, so the selection of
the managers has become critical. Verification of the
manager’s ability to provide all these advantages has
become an important part of proper due diligence. 
I talked about the importance of effective diversifi-
cation and creating a core portfolio. Private equity
investment necessitates diversification. Vintage diversifi-
cation reduces portfolio risk, and venture capital and
buyouts differ in their payout, as previously mentioned.
In addition, differences in geography, size, and sector
allow for diversification, so it is crucial to create a bird’s-
eye view to manage maintenance of the fund. This will
be very helpful in developing future strategies.
Usually a private equity fund only establishes a new
fund once every three years. From an investor’s point of
view, there are new faces every year. Selecting a manag-
er in the top quartile and maintaining the diversification
criteria of the pension fund require a process. The first
step is to make sure you have understood and analyzed
your current portfolio. Our fund is currently managed by
a fund of funds, so this process is handled by each fund
of fund. Therefore, the various fund of funds combined
as the PFA private equity program must be managed.
Finally, I wanted to highlight the importance of the
investment plan. The important thing would be to have
the perspective of the investment program as a long-
term one at the start. What I mean by this is that once
profit is realized in a private equity investment, there is
a distribution that signifies the end of the investment.
Whether a reinvestment is made is up to the discretion
of the investor. In other words, exposure cannot be con-
stant without making a new commitment for investment.
For example, say you find one or two good funds and
limit your commitments to those funds. Perhaps those
funds will follow the J-curve, and in the fourth year they
may begin to show a positive return. Ultimately, 10
years down the road, you can look back and say the
annual IRR was a certain percentage, but that is the end.
Although this is a long-term investment, from the
perspective of the entire portfolio, it is just a transient
event. So, without continued reinvestment, private equi-
ty investment programs would not have any meaning.
Continuous investment means after a few years, the
number of funds that have matured to the point of gen-
erating positive returns would increase. At this phase,
cash flow would be more stable, so recovered realized
profit could be reinvested. The cumulative, aggregate
return of the portfolio would show a rising trend. This is
the desired result and is the long-term investment that
meets the need of long-term liabilities of the pension
fund, which I mentioned earlier. However, reaching this
state takes time, and this must be fully understood. Let’s
say you commit 15 billion yen every year per various
simulations. Positive aggregate return would only be
realized in seven or eight years. Perseverance is required
in the short term.  
To summarize, many features of private equity
investments are dramatically different from those of tra-
ditional asset classes, and this must be fully understood
at the beginning. I emphasize that short-term liquidity is
sacrificed in order to aggregate profit in the long term as
part of the investment process. Whether this approach
matches the liabilities and investment strategies of the
pension plan sponsor must be fully debated. There are
certainly difficulties to endure in the short term, that is
true, but if a good program is developed, pension distri-
butions can certainly be matched in the long term. 
This is our mission, and we believe private equity
investments will play an important role. The PFA private
equity program is very new, but this is how we have
implemented our program.
GREGORY T.  WILL IAMSON 
Director of Investments, BP America Inc.
I am the senior investment manager
for BP Corporation in the United
States. BP America is the combina-
tion of the former Amoco
Corporation, Atlantic Richfield,
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Standard Oil of Ohio, and Burma Castor Oil companies.
I began my planned sponsor career with the former
Amoco Corporation after spending many years as an
investment banker, venture capitalist, and asset manager.
BP America has been investing in private equity since
the late 1970s. I have been involved in private equity
with BP since the early 1990s. Today, I would like to
introduce you to our private equity investment program
and present several thoughts as to how other companies
can also effectively invest in this rewarding, but volatile
asset class. I will first present an overview of British
Petroleum’s global pension assets and then describe in
more detail the investment program in the United States.
I’ll next describe our asset allocation strategy in the
United States, including our policy commitment to alter-
native investments and private equity. Finally, and hope-
fully most interestingly to you, I’ll describe in more
detail BP’s private equity investment strategy, its current
holdings, and our thoughts about the keys to a success-
ful private equity program.
First, an overview of BP’s pension programs. My
parent company, BP PLC, is based in London. It is one
of the world’s largest energy and chemical companies.
Companies this large tend to have significant and com-
plex benefit programs, as many of you know. In BP’s
case, the company currently has 397 different benefit
trusts in 60 countries around the globe, with total assets
of over US$40 billion and that represent some 270,000
active and nonactive beneficiaries. Having said that, the
two largest plans, representing more than 90% of the
assets and liabilities of British Petroleum, are those in
the United Kingdom and the United States. The UK and
U.S. pension trusts are managed independently by sepa-
rate, locally based investment teams. In the U.S., we cur-
rently oversee more than US$17 billion of defined benefit
assets in trust and defined contribution assets in trust as
well. My team manages these defined benefit plan assets
and oversees the investment issues associated with our
defined contribution or 401K plan trust, which is a com-
bination of 215 different mutual fund options available
to our participants. The defined benefit plan is a combi-
nation of both traditional and cash-balance retirement
plans, the cash-balance plan being established by
Amoco Corporation in the mid-1990s. As a result, we
have a very complex liability profile comprised of four
different liability classes: those employees who have
already retired and are receiving annuities; those
employees who can retire under the traditional defined
benefit plan structure; those employees who have
worked with the company when the cash-balance plan
was introduced and are eligible to take a cash-balance
distribution; and then all new employees who are auto-
matically covered under the cash-balance plan. 
At the year end 2003, the main U.S. plan was fully fund-
ed on an ABO, a PBO, and an RPA basis.  
Let me describe BP America’s defined benefit plan’s
asset allocation strategy. At the base of our pension
finance consideration, and any basic pension finance
consideration, is this equation, stating that the pension
cost of the company is equal to the benefits promised
by the company, less the investment return generated
on assets under management. 
If investment return increases due to the adoption of a
higher expected return asset class mix, the introduction
of a higher risk asset class, or through the generation of
alpha or excess return, then, other things being equal,
the pension cost to the company declines and the bene-
fit obligation is effectively met. 
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This equation also reflects the inputs required to deter-
mine our policy asset class allocation. After considering
the rate of return required to meet beneficiary obliga-
tions, current and expected levels of company funding,
and the company’s total and residual risk desires, the
U.S. pension plan adopted this policy asset class alloca-
tion in 2002. 
With a policy of 82% equities and 18% fixed income, ours
is an aggressive policy allocation compared to most other
U.S. large pension plans. Our 7% allocation to private
equity is not unusual for a large plan, however. When
we decide on our policy asset class allocation, we assume
a 15% net annualized rate of return for private equity
investments with a 30% annualized volatility both looked
at over the long term. We also assume a fairly low cor-
relation to other policy asset classes under consideration.
History shows us that private equity returns have been
in excess of our expected return level, while volatility
has been right at the 30% annualized level. Correlations
have also been very low to traditional asset class invest-
ments, with the highest correlation of .7 being to a com-
bination of 75% small-cap stocks and 25% high-yield
bonds. Intuitively, this makes sense when you consider
that private equity is just a compilation of small-cap
stocks and high-yield investments or bond exposures.  
With this information as background, let me
describe the specifics of BP America’s private equity
investment program and what we believe are the attrib-
utes of a successful private equity effort. As I men-
tioned, the former Amoco Corporation began investing
in private equity in the late 1970s, making its first ven-
ture capital partnership investment in 1978. That initial
investment was made as a substitute for traditional
small-cap stocks, which were a part of our policy asset
class exposure at that time. Private equity became a for-
mal part of our policy asset class allocation in 1983 at
the 3% target level. The policy allocation to private equi-
ty increased to 5% in 1987 and 7% in 1997, which is
where we currently stand.  
In 1993, I created the private equity approach still
in use at BP America. As a part of this effort, we stated
specific objectives that we have for the private equity
investment. These are a minimum net annualized return
of 15–20% over the long term, with returns that are
uncorrelated to other asset class investments in the port-
folio. By meeting both these requirements, we believe
that we can improve the risk-return profile of the aggre-
gate portfolio, which is our primary consideration. We
also, however, seek to use our private equity relation-
ships to provide information about products and tech-
nologies that may impact liquid companies and indus-
tries in which we also invest. We also use this informa-
tion to provide early indications on the state of the
financial activities that could affect the overall market
and thus our overall portfolio’s performance.  
Now, our private equity portfolio looks like this: 
we are currently invested with 59 general partners in
110 limited partnerships and have approximately 50% of
our investments in buyout funds, as measured by market
value, and 25% in venture capital partnerships. The rest
of our investments are opportunistic investments in such
categories as hedge funds, mezzanine debt funds, and
select direct investments. Although I have real estate listed
as an alternative investment, this is really just a residual
holding that occurred during the mergers of the many
different plans that make up BP America and is currently
being phased out of our portfolio. We have no policy
asset class allocation to real estate.  
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Let me declare that our current portfolio structure 
is not our preferred structure, by any means, but instead
is a result of the aggregation of the many company
plans that BP acquired. Our original and desired portfo-
lio would comprise 60–70% buyout funds and 30–40%
venture capital funds. We would ideally have relation-
ships with 15 to 20 top general partners, investing in 30
to 40 of their limited partnerships. As many of the part-
nerships were acquired during mergers, we will move
back to that desired portfolio structure as those partner-
ships tend to wind down.  
Some of the primary general partner relationships
that we’ve established over the years are listed here. 
In most cases, due to our long-term relationship with
the general partner, we are members of their limited
partnership advisory boards, and we were also fortunate
to have been early investors with some of these funds.
Due to the increase in investor interest in private equity
over the years, several of these and other top funds cur-
rently do not accept new investors. BP gains exposure
to private equity partnerships as a direct investor in 
specific limited partnerships, but there are three main
ways that one can gain private equity exposure. 
Our sister fund, the BP-UK Fund, recently established 
its first private equity invest program and is pursuing a
fund of funds investment approach in addition to direct
partnership investments. Fund of funds have the advan-
tage of providing quick means of investing in a diversi-
fied pool of investments, some of which are not open to
new investors, and provide administration and distribution
management capabilities. Fund of funds are expensive,
however, typically charging a fixed fee of 1% of committed
capital each year, plus 5–10% of the profits generated.
These fees, of course, are in addition to the 2% fixed fee
and 20% of the profits charged by the underlying general
partners.  
Another interesting way to gain exposure to private
equity investments is through investment in private equi-
ties via a swap or a trust relationship. The difficulty in
this approach is that finding a counterparty willing to
swap away private equity returns to you in strong mar-
ket environments is typically very difficult. When we
began investing in private equity, the only vehicle avail-
able to us at that time was direct investment in partner-
ships. Our goal, and the goal of any private equity 
program, should be to build a diversified pool of invest-
ments across industries, geographies, investment size,
yield, stage, and exit strategy. To be successful, BP has
found that taking an active role in the oversight of
investment partnerships maximizes information flow and
minimizes administrative and operational problems and
burdens. Additionally, BP has found that being oppor-
tunistic, taking advantage of desirable investment oppor-
tunities when they exist, is an important factor for success.
The most important factor in meeting our risk-return
objectives and that of any private investment program 
is, of course, selecting top managers. As this Venture
Economics survey shows, with data through the year
2002, the difference between the median and top quar-
tile manager in management returns is significant—over
20% annualized—and that means the difference between
meeting your return objectives and failing miserably.  
The main question is: how do you pick top quartile
managers? We have found success depends on six fac-
tors. First, the partnership must have a clear, focused
investment strategy that it adheres to in both favorable
and unfavorable market conditions. Second, the quality
and the experience of the partners themselves, the actu-
al people who run the investments in the businesses
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and industries in which they invest, are critical to suc-
cess. Third, a strong, proprietary source of deals, in our
experience, tends to lead to higher returns. When part-
nerships rely on auctions, purchases from other private
equity companies and accounting and law firms for their
deal flow, they tend to produce median returns at best.
Fourth, a partnership must have a clear exit strategy in
place for all of its deals at the time that the deal is done
and a backup exit strategy as well at that time. Poorly
performing funds tend to concentrate on getting a deal,
not on exiting successfully and in a timely fashion. Fifth,
the exit value received by the general and limited part-
ners should be the same. In the case of many venture
capital distributions of stock, the general partner is cred-
ited and is paid on the value of the stock on the day of
distribution to investors. When investors sell the stock,
however, in many cases, the value that they receive is
much less than the price set by the general partner. A
gap of 10%, 20%, or more is not uncommon. Sixth, the
terms of the partnership must align the general and lim-
ited partners’ interests. Claw-back clauses with regard to
fees, limits to partnership commitment terms, and the
existence of limited partnership advisory boards all serve
to better align these interests. Now, if you are going 
to use a fund of funds manager for your investment 
program, make sure that your fund of funds manager
addresses these six critical issues, as well.  
A final key issue to success lies not with the general
partner capabilities and their selection, but with the
investor’s choice of the partnership and its expected
investment portfolio. You, as an investor, need to create
a diversified portfolio in order to improve your aggre-
gate fund risk and return profile. Now, as important for
an investor as partnership selection is his own partner-
ship administration and oversight. A diversified private
equity program like BP’s generates over 300 capital calls
and cash or securities distributions each year, and it gen-
erated twice that amount per year during the bull mar-
kets of the late 1990s. Use of specialty software to help
track and administer private equity programs is helpful,
or the investor can simply outsource partnership admin-
istration and distribution management to one of the
many firms that specialize in this service.  
We have found that private equity investing is not
without risks. One of the biggest risks is that the highly
volatile private equity returns can significantly impact
the aggregate fund’s funded portfolio status. Venture
capital returns can be extremely volatile, particularly
compared with other sources of private equity exposure.
In the mid- and late 1990s, strong venture capital returns
added significant value to pension funds’ general invest-
ment programs. Unfortunately, due to the illiquid nature
of this investment, these gains could not be realized.
The reverse came to pass early in this decade as both
venture and buyout fund performance fell dramatically
and significantly contributed to pension plan underper-
formance and underfunded problems. 
Investors must consider their ability to weather venture
capital volatility when constructing a private equity port-
folio. Some investors have decided that venture capital
is too volatile and are redirecting investments away from
this area and to the favor of mezzanine and other equi-
ty-like private equity investments. Additional risks, as
previously discussed, include benchmark risk, unavail-
ability of investment opportunities when desired, and
burdensome administrative requirements.  
I feel, however, as do many other institutional
investors in the U.S. and internationally, that the benefits
of private equity investing outweigh the risks. Private
equity programs can be financially rewarding over the
long term, lowering pension costs to the sponsoring
company, and can provide key economic and business
condition information that can benefit other parts of
your aggregate portfolio.  
Discussion
ARIKAWA
Mr. Williamson, I believe your group expended some-
thing like five years before you were able to grow 
private equity as an asset class. Why did this take so
much time? What is the thinking behind this approach?
WILLIAMSON 
Initially, we took our time growing the private equity asset
class because we did not have the internal personnel
strengths and knowledge to feel that we could effectively
manage private equities on our own. Also, being early
investors in the private equity arena, there simply weren’t
that many opportunities that we could take advantage 
of at the time. When the first big buyout funds were
introduced in the United States, such as the Forstman-
Leff Fund in the early and mid-1980s, we were their first
and largest institutional investor. So, really, we waited
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for the market to catch up with our interest in being 
private equity investors. It has taken a great deal of time
for our sister company, BP-UK, to be able to introduce
its private equity program to the level that it would
desire, simply because it takes time to find the right
partnerships and the right fund of funds managers 
that are going to provide both the exposures that you
require for your aggregate portfolio concerns and diver-
sification that you require and the expected rate of
returns that you seek. As they build their program and
their knowledge, through the use of fund of funds, 
I would expect that they would bring more of those
capabilities in-house, relying in the long term less on
fund of funds managers and more on their internal staff
to carry out the program. 
ARIKAWA
BP has a unique way of assigning responsibilities. Could
you describe the plan’s sponsor vs. manager division of
responsibilities at BP?
WILLIAMSON
We have grown the asset class and from an asset alloca-
tion perspective, if we were to use an optimizer to
determine our policy asset class allocation, given the
attractive expected returns for private equity, the optimizer
will always put 100% of the assets in the private equity
arena. If you are a private equity manager, this is a good
thing, but if you are a pension plan, the optimizer, of
course, is not taking risks of private equity and potential
downside risk exposure into consideration. So, we have
limited our private equity exposure to a level that we
feel comfortable with in terms of the potential downside
risk that a bad year in venture capital or private equity
could have and would thus impact our aggregate portfolio.
In the management of alternative investments at BP,
we have constructed a team of individuals to oversee
these investments. At BP, I have a 15-person staff to
oversee all of our liquid market and private investments.
Of those 15 people, I have people who are assigned to
specific manager responsibilities and who also spend
part of their time looking after part of the private equity
marketplace. With 110 limited partnerships, no one or
two people could adequately look after that amount of
investments, so I have a five-person team who spend
20% of their time helping to look after our current 
partnerships, looking after the administration of those
partnerships, and helping to review new prospective
managers that could eventually become part of our 
private equity portfolio. It takes a while for those people
to become trained in private equity analysis, administra-
tion, and communication, but by having a team of people
where knowledge can be shared between the senior
team members and the junior team members, we are
able to bring our staff up to speed regarding private
equity investment quickly and efficiently and continue
training other personnel to help effectively manage the
asset class going forward.
ARIKAWA
Mr. Takahashi, you started with private equity investment
through fund of funds, and you are now in the process
of creating a vintage investment. In the short run, as
asset class PE, this is more of an equity or quasi-equity
stance, but you are planning a shift, am I right? 
TAKAHASHI  
Your question concerns how we position private equity
in our asset allocation policy. Currently, this is outside
our policy; we have only just begun. In money terms,
the initial commitment was 15 billion yen. We added 10
billion to that, so we have something like 25 billion yen
committed, but this is still very small compared to the
total fund size. We found it very difficult to determine a
fixed allocation using a program such as an optimizer,
because diversification by vintage year and continuous
investment are so very important. We didn’t want to
commit a large amount into one allocation from the 
very beginning. We thought that would not be the best
approach in making the private equity program effective.  
In addition, there is a time lag between the commit-
ment and the actual investment. The entire committed
amount is not invested right away; it takes a long time
to build up a certain amount of investment. Furthermore,
it takes more time before we realize profit, so it is very
hard to decide up front what the percentage target
should be. We use optimizers as to confirm a minimum
for entering into the private equity investment. However,
the important thing is to look at the characteristics of the
liabilities. How much can we invest without generating
concern for immediate liquidity? That is what the approach
will become, I think.
ARIKAWA
There is a time lag between commitment and actual
funding. The entire committed amount is not invested
right away; it will take time before a certain amount is
invested, and it’s going to take still further time before
we start to realize returns. Thus, it is very hard to decide
up front what the target should be. If we use optimizers,
we can at least confirm that there is a meaning going
into PE investment, but we have to think about that.
How much can we introduce without worrying about
immediate cash flow in hand. From that point of view,
based upon Gregory-san’s experience, PE as an asset
class compared to other asset classes has a low correla-
tion. You mentioned that it could be identified as a 
separate and independent asset class. I’m sure, however,
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that you had to put in much effort in lowering that  
correlation. You probably needed to diversify within pri-
vate equity investment as well, part of which you have
mentioned. Can you describe in greater detail how you
lowered correlations of PE against other asset classes?
WILLIAMSON
Actually, we didn’t have to do that much work to con-
struct a lower correlation portfolio. The correlations
have been what they are. Over any short-term period to
mid-term period, correlations can be spurious. You can
have a very high correlation or a very low correlation,
depending on the period. Over the longer term, however,
the fact that a well-diversified private equity portfolio
will at various points in time have commitments to very
early seed-stage funds and first-, second-, and third-stage
funds and that your buyout program will be invested 
in small, medium, and large buyout funds creates an
exposure that over the long term does not correlate very
well to any one single asset class. As I said, the highest
correlation that we found is probably to very small cap
stocks, which you would expect. Venture capital is a
very early small cap stock, and a buyout fund is, for the
most part, a collection of private companies about to 
go public, so it reflects stock-like characteristics. A well-
diversified program does not correspond well to either
large-cap stocks or mid-cap stocks or international
stocks or fixed-income portfolio. The diversification of
the different types of private equity and the size and
structure of the deals themselves are diversifiers.
ARIKAWA
Mr. Takahashi, at the PFA you have the PE outside of
the policy asset mix and you are trying to grow that, but
Gregory-san’s group clearly has introduced this as part
of the policy asset mix. You started at 3% and now it’s
7%, so you have clear numerical criteria. What is the
logic? How did you arrive at this 7% number?
WILLIAMSON 
The 7% number, for us, quite frankly is a low number.
We have ranges. We have a target of 7%, but we always
want to be between 5% and 12% private equity. As I
said, when you put the risk and return in correlation
characteristics of private equity into a mean variance
optimizer, the optimizer wants to put at least 50% of the
assets into private equity and in many cases much more.
What we did was look at the downside risk of private
equity portfolios and buyout funds and ask, over in a
bad year, two years, or three-year type environment,
how would negative performance in those areas poten-
tially impact my aggregate plan’s funded status? The
biggest risk that my aggregate fund faces is a degrada-
tion of its funded status, the need to make additional
contributions into the plan, and the need to file special
reports with the U.S. government. My company simply
doesn’t want to have to fund its plans, and based upon
downside risk analysis, we decided that 7% was the
right level for us. This level could have been anywhere
between 5% and 20% and we wouldn’t have had an
issue with it. The ultimate decision came down to the
fact that my investment committee, the senior members
of BP America who are the appointed fiduciaries of the
plan, themselves felt comfortable at the 7% level. and
that is why that number was chosen.
ARIKAWA
That is a very interesting approach. You have focused
on the characteristics of PE. Downside risk was more or
less simulated, and BP felt comfortable at 7%, and that is
how it was decided. Am I right? Also, I understand you
are using an equity benchmark of +5%. This was a very
new approach, and those of us who are not knowledge-
able find that very interesting. Can you elaborate on this
point?
WILLIAMSON
There are two issues around benchmarking any type of
investment. One is that the benchmark tries to tell you
how well your portfolio is doing versus other types of
investments like the one you are invested in: in this
case, how well your private equity portfolio is doing
versus other private equity portfolios. The second reason
for having a benchmark is that it reflects the opportunity
cost of not investing in something else: if I weren’t
investing in private equity, I would be investing in pub-
lic equity. So, on an opportunity basis, my benchmark
for private equity is whatever my returns would have
been in the public equity markets. Of course, private
equity has certain differing characteristics from public
equity, the biggest being that it is illiquid and has a
long-term holding period. Given these characteristics,
we imposed a 500-basis-point “penalty” on the perform-
ance of the private equity portfolio relative to the public
equity portfolio. This benchmark was just adopted last
year. Prior to that, we’ve had four different benchmarks:
there simply is no one good benchmark for this asset
class. Our previous benchmarks were an absolute 18%
return, which in any one year is highly volatile versus
your actual returns. Another benchmark that we had
was the 75% small-cap stock, 25% high-yield bond
benchmark to which there is a high correlation over the
long term, but unfortunately over the short term there is
really no correlation at all. The last benchmark that we
used was the Venture Economics index of private equity
managers’ returns whose fund was issued in the same
year as yours, which is an interesting benchmark. It has
a number of biases associated with it, and it also has the
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problem of being reported approximately six months
after the end of the period, so it is not a very timely
benchmark. There are a number of different benchmarks
that we have utilized, and when we spoke with a lot of
the larger institutional investors in the U.S., there seemed
to be a trend toward using this opportunity cost-based
benchmark, that is being their equity portfolio exposure
plus a liquidity premium.
ARIKAWA
Mr. Takahashi, you started from private equity invest-
ment through fund of funds. To be successful, you have
to identify those gatekeepers and fund of funds in the
top quartile to be successful. For pension funds newly
approaching this asset class, what kind of procedure is
necessary to make sure that you find that top quartile?  
TAKAHASHI
This is the very reason we used fund of funds and gate-
keepers. It is not, however, that we can use just any
fund of funds. We have to know whether they really
have accessibility, whether they perform their analysis
properly. Our task is to confirm that.
Criteria for manager selection are numerous (many
were mentioned by Mr. Williamson), but compared to
traditional assets, private equity depends much more on
the evaluation of the people themselves. They, of course,
must have skill and extensive experience. More impor-
tant, since this is going to be a long-term investment, 
we need to be able to trust that individual as a person.
The most important thing is to meet frequently with
your candidate manager and try to know the group well.
Investing in a top fund is important because we
have seen major performance differences. However, his-
torical performance is not the only criterion. It is impor-
tant to understand how the performance was achieved.
Strong performance must be due to good results, but it
is very important to know who among the manager’s
staff was actually involved, hands-on, in the projects.
Maybe that individual is no longer with the manager
organization. If that’s the case, then historical results 
are no longer meaningful.  
ARIKAWA 
Mr. Williamson, when direct investment is to be made 
in private equities, what would be the major factors in
success?
WILLIAMSON 
We do some direct investments, not through partnerships,
but either directly, independent of the partnership, or
perhaps on a side-by-side basis with a general partner.
Due to the active role that we play and the knowledge
that we have of the partnership’s underlying portfolio,
we sometimes see investment opportunities in particular
companies that we like that allow us to put additional
funds directly into an investment candidate. We look at
those types of investments in much the same way the
actual general partner would or a buyout fund manager
would. We look at the economics of the situation, the
potential timing of the deal flow, the exit strategy, the
risks associated with the deal, the amount of capital that
would be required. Typically, when we make a direct
investment, we restrict it to a very small part of the port-
folio. When we make a direct investment, it is no more
than US$5 million and typically more on the one-million-
dollar level. So, even if the investment does go bad, and
we have had more than a few in the portfolio that have,
the economic impact on the aggregate fund is not signif-
icant. When you have one that goes very well, it tends to
make up for all of those that have gone bad in the past.
ARIKAWA
Mr. Takahashi, in your experience, are there things we
need to avoid when we get started with fund of funds?
TAKAHASHI
Our experience is limited, so we have not experienced
this situation, but it is important not to be lazy when
checking fund managers. What we were particularly
careful about was to avoid conflicts of interest. Investors
such as pension funds must pay special attention to this.
For example, the fee structure or disbursement of real-
ized profit must contribute to aligning the interests of
the general partners and ourselves. Otherwise, it will be
very difficult to have a successful relationship over the
long term.
Another consideration is that the biggest source of
return of private equity lies in the hands-on approach.
Whether the manager executes this properly is something
that you have to be careful about. You cannot know this
directly; reference checks are required. Speaking with other
institutional investors is an important process, and this is
the area we are emphasizing the most going forward.
ARIKAWA
Mr. Williamson, the good funds have a limited capacity
to accept funds from the investor, so if you are to find 
a very good PE manager, what points do you take into
account?
WILLIAMSON 
You are absolutely right; the good private equity man-
agers are well known and have many more times the
investors that want to invest with them than they need
to actually complete their fund. The keys, then, if you
aren’t already an investor with one of the well-known
funds is, one, to be an extremely large investor and be
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willing to commit a substantial amount of money to a
particular fund, and two, to be an active investor and be
willing to provide additional capital to specific deals when
required. If you can do that, you might have a chance
of investing with some of these top-tier investors who
aren’t currently taking new investors into their portfolios.  
Another way to get in with some of the top
investors who might not otherwise take a direct investor
into their portfolio is to use a fund of funds that has a
relationship with that fund and then, once you are an
investor through a fund of funds, approach the general
partner and let them know that you would like to be a
direct investor in the future. The key question is, if you
are not a large investor and you cannot get access to 
the current top funds, how do you identify the up and
coming managers, those that are good, top-quartile man-
agers and still have capacity and are willing to take a
new institutional investor on board as a client? We have
found the most successful way to do this is to network
with the known top-quartile investors. General partners
know who the other good general partners are because
they all invest together in private equity deals, particu-
larly on the venture capital side of the business. A ven-
ture capital general partner does not typically fund an
entire deal himself. He brings in other partners to diver-
sify his risk and he is only going to bring in top-quartile-
type partners himself. So, a good general partner will
tell you who he thinks the other top-quartile investment
managers are and that’s a good way to start to find
those managers who might have capacity and with
whom you can invest. It’s much easier to do that than to
go out and get the venture capital directory, which has
hundreds of names in it, and start cold-calling managers.
ARIKAWA 
Mr. Williamson, you said that ultra-long-term commitment
into PE investment would be critical in order to grow
the PE asset class into a stable, resource-generating asset
class. What was your experience in 1999? You had a 140%
return and then the return plummeted dramatically.
What was the situation?
WILLIAMSON 
In 1999, my hair was completely black. It turned gray by
the end of that year. Both 1999 and 1998 were tremen-
dous years. We invested in venture capital funds in 1998
that made all of their investments, drew down all of our
committed capital, and returned 10 times our money by
the end of 1999. We had 600–700 administrative respon-
sibilities in terms of capital calls and distributions during
that period. The distributions that we got from the ven-
ture capitalists, after we received them, increased five
and tenfold in value, so it was a tremendous period.
The difficulty we had at that time was that the liquid
markets were performing very well in addition to 
private equity, and private equity was being returned to
us: we could not put enough money into private equity
to get to our target allocation at that time. Of course, 
the opposite became the case very quickly in 2002
when public market returns fell dramatically and private
equity, because it is private, did not decline in value as
much as the public markets due to the fact that these
investments were priced at cost, and we became over-
weight in private equity relative to the liquid portfolio. 
It still wasn’t performing well, but we couldn’t reduce
our exposure at all due to the illiquidity of the asset
class, so the last five years has shown us the tremen-
dous highs and the tremendous lows that investors 
can see in private equity. If you can live through those
periods, I think you can live through anything with
regard to this asset class. 
I have to say that, over the long term, since incep-
tion, we’re still annualizing over 20% net returns, even
given the difficult market environment that occurred
over the last four years—last year’s returns were flat 
at best. I will say that 2004 is already looking to be 
a very positive year for private equity. Market activity
has increased dramatically during the first month of 
this year. We have already seen five major distributions 
from our venture capital and buyout funds this year 
and, given the lag effect between private equity and 
the general economy of about 6 and 18 months, I think
now is a good time to put some money to work in 
private equity if you have the chance.
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MODERATOR: MARK MASON
The hedge fund industry has grown significantly in
recent years. First developed in 1949 by Alfred Winslow
Jones, hedge funds today exceed 6,000 in number with
estimated assets under management of more than
US$600 billion. Although the field has grown rapidly, 
we know that there are clearly risks as well as potential
rewards in hedge fund investing, so we must analyze this
subject extremely carefully. Given the growing interest
in hedge funds, both in the West and now, apparently,
in Japan, we are fortunate to have two excellent speakers
to help us analyze this very important topic: Mr. Yoshihide
Furuya, representing the Japan Computer Information
Service Employees’ Pension Fund, and Dr. Francesco
Mainolfi from the World Bank Pension Fund.
YOSHIHIDE FURUYA
Japan Computer Information Service
Employees’ Pension Fund
Our fund was established as a fund
for the information and technology
industry in February 1982. We have
1,200 companies and 132,000 partic-
ipants. The ratio between pensioners and active members,
in terms of maturity, is 4.1%, and even if you include
deferred pensioners, the ratio is still at 12.8%. Right now,
the ratio calculated based on the assets vs. liabilities is
80.8% at present, so we are underfunded. In terms of
the monetary value-based maturity, the ratio of the annual
benefits paid divided by annual contributions is 24.5%. 
You can see that the average age of our members 
is quite young, and so our maturity is quite low still.
Therefore, the asset mix that can be derived from AUM
has characteristics of higher risk tolerance. We can and
do have greater weight in risky assets. With regard to
the long-term asset mix, the expected return of 6.75%
and the risk of 10.91% are assumptions. We started at
10% of allocation in alternatives and practical asset mix,
and we have 5.55% in expected returns and 10% allocated
for risk over the next five years.
As for our manager structure, 90% of assets follow
our policy asset mix; therefore, we have a passive core
and active satellite as the main elements of our struc-
ture. In the passive core, we automatically rebalance to
policy asset mix, based on the inflow of our monthly
contributions. The style of our funds includes both
domestic and foreign equities, and we do rebalance to
meet the active mix policy. Active management is done
by specialty managers, and currently we have more than
one benchmark in order to have diversification across
styles. We also reevaluate managers.
Again, 10% of our assets are in alternative assets.
We currently use two trust banks, and 2.5% each is
given to each of four alternative investments. We have a
low-risk, low-return fund of hedge funds; a middle-risk,
middle-return fund of hedge funds; high-risk, high-return
managed futures; and a real estate fund, going after
income again in the main.
As our policy is to stick quite closely to our policy
asset mix, for the last three years we underperformed
and had considerable negative returns. 
However, because of the automatic rebalancing strategy,
so far, year-to-date, we have been able to recoup the
lost ground. The three-year, continuous, negative return
is really due to weakness in domestic stocks. We found
that a portfolio composed only of equity and fixed
income was not really giving us enough diversification.
We started our study of alternatives back in September
2000. We tried very hard to meet in person with the
managers to listen to their stories and strategies and
learn about the management process, so that we could
capture investment ideas that could be included in our
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Panel 2: Hedge Funds
own portfolio. In July 2002, we formulated an alterna-
tive investment program that included real estate, private
equity, and other alternatives. We looked at what would
be the desirable weight of this class. The investment
committee approved the program and we started imple-
mentation, based upon the formulated program.
In October 2002, as a substitute for yen bond, for
the first time, we invested in a fund of hedge funds for
low risk and low return. In February 2003, we started
investing in real estate funds with the main goal of
income gains through diversified investments in real
estate funds, large offices, and housing. In March 2003,
we started managed futures with high risk, high return.
Finally, in April, we newly adopted a fund of hedge funds
with mid-level risk and mid-level returns. Most recently,
we decided to include a currency overlay strategy.
We had three objectives for our alternative invest-
ments. First, we wanted them to fulfill a complementary
function in the case of a crisis in traditional assets.
Second, we wanted to reduce risk via the low correla-
tion with traditional assets. Finally, we wanted to pursue
absolute returns. In other words, by expanding invest-
ment vehicles, we hoped to achieve diversification and
risk reduction, while seeking the alphas that could be
obtained by skillful managers. Essentially, our main
objective is to limit the downside risk of our portfolio.
In including alternative assets into our funds portfolio,
we began by looking at the risk-return characteristics and
correlations with traditional assets, examining several 
alternative strategies. Then, we moved on to ascertain the
desirable weight, but always kept in mind that we had to
maintain our asset policy mix as a basis. The basis of the
review was an expected return of 5.07%, a standard devia-
tion of 11.09%, and a 95%VaR (Value at Risk) of 13.2%. 
We began by automatically simulating the results,
first, if we had included alternative assets at 5%, 10%,
and 15% across the portfolio, and then, we simulated
substituting them for 5%, 10%, and 15% of domestic
equity, which was not doing very well. We found that 
in each of the two simulated cases, we would have
improvement. If you substitute “some kind of alternative”
for specific assets, however, this means giving up the
upside potential of the equity. Thus, we decided that 
we would be taking the position of maintaining a policy
asset mix and having, on top of that, alternatives. 
As for weighting, in deciding whether to allocate 5%,
10%, or 15%, we employed a method based on risk budg-
eting. However, 5% does not really give us much of a ben-
efit in using the new technology, and 15%, compared with
our peer group, would be excessive. Thus, we judged that
10% would be more or less the desirable and appropriate
weight for us.
We moved on to manager selection. We felt that our
fund was not really prepared to do the due diligence. 
You may think that is naïve, but we felt that it was very
difficult for us to identify good hedge funds. Particularly
because we resided in Japan, we felt it would be very 
difficult to find overseas hedge funds. It is not easy to
understand these very thick due diligence documents in
English, to understand what the audit reports are really
saying, and to decide how best to change strategy alloca-
tion. As we believe that the purpose of introducing alter-
natives is to have diversity among and along strategies, 
we decided to outsource this task.
We felt that we should invest through managers
whom trust banks had chosen among several gatekeepers
that had the same perspectives our fund had as an
investor. We thought that such gatekeepers should be 
in Japan and have local offices so that we could access
them directly, at any time. Whether they were quantitative
or qualitative in strategy, we wanted to limit ourselves to
the kinds of schemes that trust banks could fire without
a problem. Also, we established a condition that gate-
keepers themselves must be investing their own money
alongside ours. How do we access quality gatekeepers? 
We met and talked with many managers and established
our own channels to identify good gatekeepers. At the
same time, we have used the channels of trust banks,
which have done considerable due diligence and have
established partnerships with overseas gatekeepers. This
ensures that we are doing double due diligence.
Let me introduce you to the fund of hedge funds in
which we are investing. 
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The first is a low-risk, low-return fund of hedge funds.
This particular gatekeeper has three hedge fund strategies,
and its strength is in the relatively low-risk region. The
operation target is a return of yen Libor plus 3% or so
with a risk of 3% or less. As you can see, what we expect
is really low, rather than not being very high. This is a
European manager, and the fund is a global type with less
exposure to North America. It is very well diversified, with
41 funds included. This particular manager recently ranked
number 20 among the top 50 funds of hedge funds by
Institutional Investor magazine.
The next fund of hedge funds is a mid-risk, mid-
return fund. This particular gatekeeper invests in 15 strate-
gies, which it classifies into four categories. The target is
yen Libor plus 6–8% with a risk of less than 8%, which is
a little higher than the previous fund of hedge funds, but
currently, we are controlling risk at or below 5%. This
fund is quite new in that it includes about a 20% exposure
to directional trading, which is unusual among fund of
hedge funds. They have 82 funds incorporated, which 
is very large, and this particular manager is ranked 10th
among the top 50. 
The last fund of hedge funds includes high-risk, high-
return managed futures. It is quite unusual for a pension
fund to invest in this. This fund of hedge funds has a sin-
gle-manager structure, the CTA (Commodity Trading
Advisor), and we could call them a futures trader. They
invest in more than 100 products and commodities in the
futures market all over the world. The operation employs
a totally computerized, systematic management with no
room for human judgment. You may wonder why we
have adopted this high-volatility strategy into our portfolio.
The reason is that this particular strategy has a very strong
negative correlation with equity. As our portfolio has a
high exposure to equity, we felt that this instrument
would give us diversification. This style is also called a
trend follower: if equities and bonds increase in value,
they long those positions, and if they go down, they short.
According to this strategy, they can really make a profit in
both directions. Risk control is very strict, and the down-
side deviation is lower than the downside deviation of
equity positions. 
As for monitoring after introduction, we will continue
to see if the return is as stable as before introduction, 
if the probability of positive return is as promised, if the
downside risk is well managed and controlled, if they are
taking an attendant risk control to avoid unexpected risk,
if low correlations with traditional asset classes are main-
tained, and finally, if they do contribute to the perform-
ance of the overall fund. In conclusion, I’d like to say 
that we have mixed together strategies with different risk
characteristics and different correlations and we have risk
budgeting to place more money into lower risk strategies,
so that, for the alternative asset portfolio as a whole, as
well as for the portfolio as a whole, we are able to create
a very diversified portfolio with a stable profit.
FRANCESCO MAINOLFI
Principal Investment Officer,
World Bank Pension Fund 
We manage two plans at the World
Bank. One is a staff retirement plan,
which is roughly US$10 billion in
current assets. We also manage a
retired staff medical benefits plan that is currently
approximately US$1 billion in assets. We run a pretty
unique hybrid plan, which has both a defined contribu-
tion component and a defined benefit component, and
we are fairly large in that we have approximately 18,000
participants to our pension plan globally, of which there
are 6,300 retirees. 
There are some unique features to our pension fund
and our pension plan that affect the way we approach
investing across all assets and affect our strategic asset
allocation. First, we have full indexation to inflation.
This was one of the commitments the World Bank made
when they established this pension fund. Also—this is
very unusual—part of our liabilities are in non-U.S. dol-
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lars. One of the great aspects of the World Bank is that
when you retire, because of the huge international staff,
you can elect to have your pension paid in any currency
you wish, and you can have that change as you move
around the globe if you wish. Nor are we bound by any
U.S. pension regulations or ERISA, but we try to adhere
to them as much as possible in our investments. Finally,
because we are an international institution, we are not
governed or covered by any of the U.S. government
pension guarantees. So, as a pension participant, I do
bear some of the credit risk of the World Bank. That
also does define the way in which I go about making
the investments that I do in hedge funds, and it also
defines how the entire pension team approaches invest-
ments. By the general standards of measuring funded
ratios in the U.S., the PBO, we are actually overfunded,
but the bank approaches this in a much more conserva-
tive way and uses the closed group methodology to
compute our funded ratio. The bank decided to do this
as a means of committing the bank to make regular con-
tributions to the pension fund and not rely completely
on the investment returns. In other words, it did this in
order to have a much longer time perspective.
Operationally, we have a very flexible structure.
Pension investments are primarily set up as an internal
fund of funds operation across all of the asset classes in
which we invest: equities, fixed income, private equities,
real estate, hedge funds, and our currency overlay pro-
gram. Our pension board is actually very hands-off, 
in that they set the allocation amounts and risk return
targets that are required of us and they stay away from
manager selection and tactical positioning. Those deci-
sions are left up to the pension investment teams that
report to the director of the pension fund.
Another unique characteristic of our pension fund
that sets it apart from comparable plans is that the World
Bank has typically had, and continues to have, a lower
allocation to equities than most other pension funds. In
particular, we have a higher allocation to alternatives
and hedge funds than is typical. In fact, our hedge fund
allocation is 12% of our staff retirement plan and 23% 
of our medical benefits plan. It is quite high; it exceeds
many endowments and foundations, if you recall the
statistics you saw presented earlier. 
Why hedge funds? The World Bank Pension Fund
views alternative investments as offering diversification
benefits, return enhancement, and risk stability over that
which we could achieve by equity and fixed income
investments alone. Hedge funds, in particular, offer
transparency and liquidity features that are not available
from real estate and private equity investments, and the
bank has decided to continuously increase the allocation
to hedge funds over the history of our involvement in it,
particularly due to the return and diversification benefits
that we have been able to achieve. In fact, the World
Bank has a very long history in hedge funds. 
We made our first hedge fund investment in 1980. The
program was primarily outsourced through the early
1990s and was brought back in-house at that time. It
was run as part of the equities investments until 1998,
when our pension board decided a separate and direct
approach to hedge funds was warranted and the pro-
gram was greatly expanded. 
Hedge funds, as you have heard in many of the
previous discussions, are a very dynamic asset class,
experiencing significant change. Assets are growing, the
number of funds in operation has increased steadily,
and institutional participation is on the rise. Hedge funds
offer a number of benefits, including great diversification
opportunities and the potential for high risk-adjusted
returns, and we believe greatly that when combined in 
a properly constructed portfolio, hedge funds offer the
potential for consistent risk-adjusted returns, which is
one of the main drivers for our participation.
The benefits are greater; however, there is always 
a caution that is worth noting. Investing in and under-
standing hedge funds is not easy. This asset class is
characterized by a large number of fairly complex strate-
gies with different risk-return profiles and market expo-
sures, and so one needs to exercise care in approaching
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the asset class. Looking at the relative ranking of various
hedge fund strategies from 1994–2002, the strategy per-
formance is highly variable over time, making it difficult
to pick the best hedge fund strategies using simple
methods and historic performance alone. The main
point is that strategy diversification is the approach to
take. Earlier, we saw some statistics on the Japanese
pension fund experience with hedge funds and in inter-
preting one should bear in mind this graph that most of
the Japanese hedge fund investments were concentrated
in equity market neutral and long-short strategies. Over
the last three to four years, they have been very variable
in performance and have experienced some of the worst
performance in strategies. I would like to make the case
for taking an approach that is much more diversified
across strategies. 
It also ends up being very difficult to pick individual
hedge fund managers using simple methods. 
If we take a number of top quartile hedge funds begin-
ning in 1999 and track their performance over the sub-
sequent three years, we can see that, of the original 241
funds in 1999 that were top quartile, only 6 remain as top
quartile in 2002. The story, unfortunately, is much the
same if you follow a gatekeeper or fund of funds route.
Over the same period, of the 112 top quartile funds in
1999, only one is still top quartile in 2002. Simple selec-
tion processes don’t optimize returns at both the manag-
er and strategy level. What matters most is how the
managers and strategies allocations are combined in a
portfolio. The aggregation of idiosyncratic risks and the
effective diversification of these risks and strategies in a
portfolio are paramount for success in this asset class. 
Here are some recurring comments from hedge
fund managers that I (and others) have heard. Many of
these actually relate to what many call the idiosyncratic
or hidden risks of the hedge fund asset class. “Investing
in hedge funds is not easy, particularly because there
are a number of risks that are not apparent immediately
from using standard or traditional investment tools.”
“Hedge funds have nonnormal return distributions,”
which means that, using standard mean variance tech-
niques, we don’t fully capture the risks inherent and we
can tend to overallocate to the asset class if we are not
careful. “While there are many different ways in which
hedge funds are not market neutral, beta exposures and
correlations are very variable over time.” We’ve heard that
over and over during the discussion. More importantly,
in stressed market environments, these betas and corre-
lations can quickly approach one, and so we lose the
diversification benefits that we were seeking to obtain.
In fact, as we have heard, many hedge fund strategies
use illiquid securities. This is another source of inherent
risk in the asset class, much because the use of illiquid
securities leads to an underestimation of the risk and the
volatility for these strategies and can lead to overallocations
to them. Hedge fund strategies use leverage and that’s a
fact. Leverage is very difficult to measure, especially when
the manager uses derivative securities. Finally, many
investment strategies that hedge fund managers follow
inherently are akin to writing insurance policies on mar-
ket events. These implicit options in the strategy are
more prevalent than we are led to believe. In fact, they
exist across equity strategies and fixed income strategies. 
At the World Bank, we recognize that standard
techniques are insufficient in managing a hedge fund
portfolio and approaching the investments. 
Our approach to building hedge funds was really to design
a dynamic, risk-efficient methodology where we integrate
the four principal components (asset allocation, portfolio
management, manager selection, and risk management)
in building a hedge fund portfolio. 
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The goal is to then be able to include these liquidity and
event risk issues much more fully in the portfolio con-
struction process. Essentially, the most important aspect
of building a hedge fund portfolio is due diligence and not
only initial due diligence, but the ongoing monitoring and
due diligence of the fund. Many institutions fail at the
latter. Once the hedge fund investment is made, it ends
up being essentially a buy and hold approach, whereas
much greater success could come from ongoing moni-
toring. Risk management for this asset class cannot be
quantitative in nature alone. Value at risk and other stan-
dard risk measures are very insufficient in this asset class.
The qualitative aspects are as, if not more, important.
These qualitative aspects of risk management and port-
folio management for hedge funds only become apparent
in the due diligence process, in the ongoing monitoring. 
We have a very multiphased process to investing in
hedge funds. This, at times, annoys some of the hedge
fund managers, because it takes us quite a bit of time to
make an allocation. In the end, however, they realize that
we are investing in this asset class for the long haul and
this is necessary information. That is another key lesson
in approaching this asset class: to really take the time to
understand the strategies. Take the time to understand how
this hedge fund fits within your hedge fund portfolio and
then within your greater pension fund portfolio. The
long-term experience is much better from that approach.
The key for this asset class is risk management. 
The number of events that have led to volatility spikes
has been ever increasing in recent history. While this may
provide good opportunities for hedge fund managers, it
becomes quickly apparent that managing risk is key to
success in this asset class and you must be dynamic and
multidimensional in the way you approach risk. 
One final note on risk management is a quote from
a very famous hedge fund manager: “The second worst
thing is to have no risk system, but the worst thing is to
lose the skepticism in the risk system you have.” The
message behind that is to really evaluate and reevaluate
continuously the objectives of your program, the ration-
ale for investing in hedge funds, and the tools and tech-
niques you use to both determine the allocation to
hedge funds and monitor them on an ongoing basis. 
Discussion
MASON
Mr. Furuya, in your view, should hedge funds be con-
sidered a separate asset class or a subset of a traditional
asset class?
FURUYA
I think it should be considered in the final analysis as a
separate entity, but one possible approach could include,
as a phase, looking at it as a traditional asset subset.
Ultimately, I think the risks and returns are very differ-
ent from those of the traditional assets, so we should
really consider alternative assets as independent and
separate assets. 
MAINOLFI
I feel it is probably a little bit of both. Many strategies
can be thought of as overlays to traditional fixed income
and equity investment: long-short equity, equity market
neutral. The risk profiles are similar to the traditional
asset classes, but many hedge fund strategies don’t fit
into these risk profile buckets, and so we, at the World
Bank, look at the strategies in terms of their risk profile.
We find that it ends up being easier and more efficient
to consider hedge funds a separate asset class, because
we can better aggregate and control these risks. So I am
in agreement with Mr. Furuya. I think the best and easiest
way to look at hedge funds would be to consider them
a separate asset class.
MASON
Mr. Furuya, how does your institution assess the perform-
ance of hedge funds, and what role, if any, do so-called
hedge fund benchmarks play?
FURUYA 
Performance is not just composed of returns. Of course,
you have to consider risk, downside deviations, or
Sharpe ratios and Sortino ratios. You have to really look
at these quantitative indices as well. When we pay
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attention to hedge funds, we evaluate the performance,
including quantitative aspects such as what is the size of
the maximum draw-down; when that maximum draw-
down is hit, how quickly you can recover; and what is
the hit ratio, i.e., what is the probability and incidence
of positive returns coming?
As hedge fund indices, we use somewhat relative
measures, such as measuring correlations or diversifica-
tion effects. It is true that there are all kinds of hedge
fund indices, but depending upon what strategies are
included, the performance is very different from one 
to another, and so you have to be very careful in using
indices.
MAINOLFI
Officially, we use the S&P hedge fund index as our
benchmark, but only insofar as it provides an indication
of the opportunities available to hedge fund managers.
It is really used as an indicator of general performance
in the asset class. To benchmark our performance, we
use the same criteria with which we selected and built
the hedge fund portfolio, which is to examine the expo-
sures across a wide set of risk factors of not only each
of the individual hedge funds, but also the hedge fund
portfolio. We monitor our exposure to, for example,
credit spreads, our exposure to the slope of the yield
curve, to volatility, and such.
MASON
Mr. Furuya, in addition to performance, what other crite-
ria do you focus on in selecting hedge funds or perhaps
even fund of funds? For example, hedge fund style, AUM,
length of performance, manager reputation, use of lever-
age, and so forth. To be provocative, I believe it was
Julian Robertson, the founder of Tiger, always said to
focus on the manager—that ultimately you invest in 
people, not things. Do you agree? What are the key
assessment factors? How is this process different from
selecting traditional investment products?
FURUYA
As for investment style, we look at whether there is
appropriateness or consistency. So, if the style the fund
uses has drifted, this is a fund that we want to examine
closely. Maybe a style that was valid and viable up to
now suddenly becomes unviable all of sudden. That is
possible, but we need to be careful there.
With regard to the total amount of fund assets, I
think that there is a certain appropriate AUM for each
strategy, and if the manager exceeds that appropriate
AUM level, it means that the manager is, perhaps, 
somewhat greedy and wants to earn fees. We have 
to be careful about that.
As for the track record, I think that the principle of
“the longer, the better” does generally apply. However,
in the case of hedge funds, as the life cycle of a hedge
fund is relatively short, if we wait three years, then
investments may be made when it is too late. The
length of the track record may be secondary. It should
be the people that we focus upon, the past records or
achievements of the manager. It is the individual that I
am talking about. The individual is very important to us.
With regard to leverage, for each strategy, within the
peer group there is this standard level. As long as there is
no great deviation from the standard level, it should be
okay. In a case such as LTCM, which had a large leverage,
I think this is quite evident from the quantitative aspect.
As long as it is on a standard level, that would suffice.
As for the difference in how we evaluate our man-
agers compared to our approach in traditional investment,
I think that we are very much dependent on the individ-
ual managers as people, in the case of hedge funds.
MAINOLFI
We select funds using a multidimensional process with
both qualitative and quantitative tools. At the end of the
day, what matters most is how a fund fits into our port-
folio’s risk return profile. We assess this incremental
impact of each of our funds to the portfolio along this
multidimensional risk framework, but we actually spend
the vast majority of our time in selecting the fund on the
qualitative aspects of fund selection. We look for managers
that can clearly demonstrate and articulate their invest-
ment edge and their skill. We look for experience and
integrity, much more than the length of track record or
the assets under management. We look for their ability
to manage their strategy in difficult market periods. We
are very concerned with transparency, not only position-
level transparency, but the transparency of the investment
process and the risk management process the manager
follows. 
We actually view our investments much more as
partnerships, and we like to be involved and understand
the environment the manager trades within, and so we
obviously tend to move toward managers who have a
much more free-flowing information source on this aspect.
We spend quite a bit of time assessing whether a man-
ager can run a stable business and retain the talent that
he has gathered to build the strategy. More hedge funds
fail because of operational problems and because they
cannot run a business than actually fail because of per-
formance issues. Mr. Robertson has it right—hedge funds
are really a talent pool. Unfortunately, talent isn’t always
scaleable and so you really need to concentrate on assess-
ing the talent that you are going to be investing with.
MASON
Mr. Furuya, as compared to U.S. pension funds, the 
data from the Pension Fund Association of Japan 
suggests that Japanese pension funds more often use
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traditional investment managers, rather than gatekeepers
or funds of funds, to help select hedge funds in which
to invest. I realize you do not represent the entire pen-
sion fund industry of Japan, but could you give us your
thinking as to this contrast?
FURUYA
This is my personal view, but, after all, while we use
investment vehicles such as gatekeepers and fund of
funds, there is another layer in between, that is the 
traditional asset manager. That is partly because we 
didn’t have much information concerning fund of funds.
Moreover, people were not really confident about the
due diligence that they carry out. The investment scheme
is for pension trusts, and so the trust banks had the
accumulation of know-how.
The infrastructure of the pension funds would not
be up to appropriate levels compared to the United
States, especially in terms of the talent pool and the
level of experience and the resource level. Therefore,
we felt we could not do everything by ourselves.
Outsourcing was sought by the Japanese pension funds
to partner with a reliable outside manager.
Of course, the objective of being successful and
investing in good and high-quality hedge funds would
be the same between Japan and the United States. The
route of access to good hedge funds is somewhat differ-
ent—we had, if you will, a detour in Japan.
MASON
Dr. Mainolfi, do you have a view as to the apparently
more common use by U.S. pension funds of gatekeepers
or funds of funds, rather than traditional investment
managers in hedge fund selection?
MAINOLFI
First, I’d like to comment on the fact that investing in
hedge funds is very much a learning process, and the
desire is always to be successful at the investments in
many cases. Therefore, most approach it in terms of tak-
ing toeholds and to learn the process by doing and
being very slow at it. Most of the institutions in the U.S.
and the World Bank follow this process. Our first invest-
ments were through fund of funds and through an
external process, and as we gained comfort with the
asset class, we internalized it and began directly invest-
ing. I think the realization that it was very much a differ-
ent beast than a traditional investment process led us to
shy away from using traditional investment managers
and gear more toward the expertise or using fund of
funds for help in selecting and learning the business of
hedge fund selection. Very much, hedge fund investing
is a learning process, and the extreme costs are what
have caused many of the U.S. pension funds, I believe, 
to take a very slow and very deliberate approach in this
asset class. For many U.S. pension funds, the risk they
face is not the investment risk, but the “headline” risk.
You don’t want to wake up in the morning and see your
pension fund’s name next to the name of a hedge fund
that either has been caught in a fraud or a blow-up,
because going to work that morning can be a very long
walk. During this learning process, having this extra
layer gives an extra sense of security, in that there is a
very dedicated staff of people at a fund of funds whose
business it is solely to select hedge funds.
MASON
Mr. Furuya, to what extent is liquidity a concern when
you invest in hedge funds, and how does this affect
your overall hedge fund strategy?
FURUYA
Because we are a pension fund, given the nature of our
assets and liabilities, we are really long-term investors.
We don’t really need to have high liquidity in all assets
we hold. At the same time, however, if you invest in
hedge funds, you depend so much on the skills of fund
managers or, in case of fund of funds, on gatekeepers.
You can really be subject to a deterioration of perform-
ance if a style drifts or if a talent exodus occurs. When
you recognize that performance has deteriorated substan-
tially, you want to remove risk by selling and liquidating
your position. That kind of liquidity is very important.
A 60-day notice after deciding to liquidate the asset
may give you liquidity. However, in our case, I would
say that if we can recoup all the investments within three
to five months, we take it as a sufficient level of liquidity.
I introduced you to the fund of funds and managed
futures we invest in. We can liquidate the fund of funds
on a monthly or quarterly basis, and the futures, on a
weekly basis. Thus, we have a variety of liquidation periods.
MAINOLFI
First off, we tend to view liquidity in two ways. First, we
view the liquidity of the investment with the manager of
the hedge fund in terms of lock-ups and notice periods.
Second, we view the liquidity of the underlying positions
the manager trades, which we feel is a much more
important thing to track and to monitor and of which to
be cognizant. To invest successfully in any asset class,
you need to have some investment horizon in mind.
Especially as it relates to alternatives and hedge funds, 
if you don’t have at least a year investment horizon, you
will likely lose more by jumping in and out of the secu-
rities than you would be able to gain by having the extra
flexibility. In general, we are fine with a year lock-up. 
We are in a unique position in that we have a lot 
of bargaining power. We usually enter into side letter
agreements that allow us to redeem in cases of style
drift or key personnel no longer being involved with 
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the fund or other severe cases. What concerns us most,
however, is the liquidity of the underlying positions. 
As an example, if I have daily liquidity with the hedge
fund manager, but this hedge fund manager trades in
distressed debt securities, then the fact that I can redeem
my money in a day isn’t very helpful. This is because
the underlying securities aren’t priced or traded on a
day-to-day basis, and a forced liquidation of that hedge
fund portfolio to meet my redemption can actually be
more damaging than if I were to wait for three or six
months for the portfolio manager to trade out of the
position. What we look for is a match in the liquidity 
of the investment in the fund and the liquidity of the
underlying securities that the manager trades. Obviously,
if someone wants a three-year lock-up to trade futures
contracts, we have a problem making that investment,
just as we have a problem having weekly liquidity with
someone who trades distressed corporate debt. It is 
one of the trade-offs, one of these balancing acts, with
liquidity. The underlying positions or securities traded
are really much more important in determining the risks
of the investment than the actual liquidity you have with
the manager. A little bit of bargaining power helps solve
the first problem.
MASON
Mr. Furuya, how important is transparency to you in both
manager selection and monitoring after an investment
has been made?
FURUYA
Generally, it is correct to assert, “the higher the trans-
parency, the better,” but if we do receive an excessive
amount of information, we investors cannot really digest
that flood of information. For the manager, the positions
they hold are actually a trade secret. We, as an investor,
should respect this. Of course, we do want to know the
investment process—the sources of return and of risk.
We need full disclosure. That would be quite sufficient.
MAINOLFI
Transparency is very important to the World Bank and
to our investment process. That’s both transparency at
the initial investment phase, or transparency phase in
the risk management process and operations of the
hedge fund, but also for ongoing transparency. We have
currently 35 hedge fund investments, and we receive full
position-level transparency from about 80% of the man-
agers. From the next 15%, we receive detailed exposure
reports. All of this information is piped through an
external risk platform that gathers the information and
compiles it for us, so we went the route of really devot-
ing the resources to build the platform to be able handle
the information. My team and I have designed many of
the risk processes, and we have used the external platform
to give the hedge fund managers comfort to provide us
with that detailed information, even if they would not
otherwise provide it to other hedge funds. We feel that
for our investment process, it is important to have. We
stress that.
MASON
Mr. Furuya, how do you manage risk in fund selection
and fund management? What are some of the really
important issues we have to keep in mind about risk
and how to deal with it?
FURUYA
As I said before, our portfolio uses gatekeepers. We don’t
really do the individual fund’s risk management. If you
are invested in 80 funds, it becomes very difficult to get
directly involved in an individual fund’s risk manage-
ment, and we have assigned that task to the gatekeepers
because it is better for us.
Of course, you need to analyze the strategy of each
hedge fund. You need sophisticated knowledge and
expertise to do that effectively. In quantitative analysis,
the return distribution does not follow the normal distri-
bution. It is very difficult to come up with statistics that
are in any way significant and meaningful. My under-
standing is that VaR and methodologies to quantify risk
are something that is very difficult to apply.
If you look at the detailed aspects of risk manage-
ment, I think you should really leave it to the gatekeep-
ers, because they have better tools to do that. We look
at the fund of funds as a single sort of investment and
look at the diversification effects with other traditional
asset classes.
MAINOLFI
Risk management is integral to the entire investment
process for hedge funds at the World Bank. We’ve spent
quite a bit of time and resources building very much a
redundant risk platform. We both monitor and measure
risk internally within the hedge fund group, and we use
this external platform that I mentioned to also run
processes and handle the information flow. To any risk
system, in agreement with Furuya-san, you need multi-
ple processes, and, given the nature of hedge funds, the
risk system needs to be very dynamic. From a technical
perspective, we use factor risk exposures, and we moni-
tor the links between these factor risks exposures for
each of the hedge funds. We use stress and scenario
analyses. We do quite a bit in terms of extreme market
and tail-risk analyses for the portfolio, and we measure
this optionality of the portfolio and directionality of both
the managers and the strategies within the portfolio. In
many respects, I agree with the statements of VaR being
insufficient. In many ways, value at risk tells you how
much you could lose if everything goes right, meaning
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your assumptions that you made to come up with this
value at risk model all have to hold in the market. We
all know that whenever you need these models to work
the most is when they don’t, and so we really rely on
multiple sources for measuring the risk and to be
dynamic. Concentrating also on the qualitative aspects 
of risks and the operational risk management of hedge
funds is very important in this ongoing dialogue and
interaction with the managers. Our ongoing due dili-
gence process is the most important aspect of risk man-
agement. In fact, the real work in hedge fund investing
comes after you have made the allocation and not in 
the process by which you arrive at the allocation—the
ongoing monitoring and interaction and information
flow with the managers.
MASON
The rapid growth of the hedge fund industry has begun
to attract greater interest on the part of government reg-
ulators, at least in the United States. I would like to ask
the panelists, beginning with Mr. Furuya, about whether
there will be greater public regulation of hedge funds. 
I would add a footnote that the U.S. SEC released a very
detailed report on the hedge fund industry, including
regulatory issues. In addition, Mr. Furuya, what are your
biggest concerns about more regulation? If there is more
regulation, do you think it will increase or decrease the
attractiveness of hedge funds to institutions such as yours?
FURUYA
The SEC recognizes those hedge fund managers as
investment advisors and may move to have them regis-
tered. The level of attention to the hedge fund industry
is heightening, and I believe that the regulation will be
reinforced further.
I think the point that is noted by the SEC is the
process of fair valuation of the portfolio. The accuracy
of the return and disclosure of information, I believe,
will be improved. From the long-term institutional
investors’ point of view, I think hedge funds will become
more attractive.
MAINOLFI
On the perspective of there being more regulation, I do
believe that is the case. The worry is how burdensome
this regulation is, because the big risk is that, with more
regulation, the regulators don’t really understand the
asset class, and usually, when that is the case, regulation
is very inefficient and overly burdensome. The real risk
with hedge funds is that they will lead to a bifurcation
of talent. The good hedge funds that have no problem
raising assets will be able to move offshore, not be 
subject to the regulation and still be able to attract the
offshore investors. The mediocre funds will satisfy the
regulations and stay onshore and have the great pool 
of domestic investors to attract. 
The real problem is that I think a lot of times, regu-
lation leads to a false sense of security. My big fear is
that many pension plans, many investors will allow reg-
ulation to supplant their own investment process and
take comfort in the fact that the SEC has said they are
going to monitor style drift, even though they don’t know
what style drift is, and that means that the investor
won’t need to contact the portfolio manager or track the
investment. I think this institutionalization or regression
to the mutual fund industry is really problematic.
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MODERATOR:
NOBORU YAMAGUCHI  
Executive Vice Chairman and CIO,
JTB Pension Fund 
As mentioned earlier by Mr. Nakamura
of PFA, Japanese pension funds
have only just begun investing in
alternative investment vehicles, especially real estate.
Today we have invited a representative from a Canadian
pension fund with a long history of real estate investing
and a representative from Osaka Gas, who has already
started investing in Japanese real estate-related products.
We are all here to learn from our predecessors in this
market. The experiences of the panelists should help 
us understand what we need to be careful about for a
smooth introduction into real estate investment; what
are the things that we should and should not do when
starting fund management. First, I would like to invite
Mr. Ishida of Osaka Gas to give us that report about his
experience and then ask that Dr. Leo de Bever of the
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan to do the same. 
HIDEKAZU ISHIDA 
Investment Officer, Osaka Gas
Osaka Gas Tax Qualified Pension
Fund was established in 1974 as an
external qualified fund and is not
an employee pension fund. Many
companies in the utility industry
have this kind of pension fund scheme, so although we
exchange much information with PFA members, we
unfortunately are not a member. Concerning the struc-
ture of the pension fund, we primarily run a lifetime
pension plan with a 15-year guarantee, with a standard
payout of 80,000 yen per month for union members.
The industry average is high, and we are trying to catch
up with the standard. We currently have some 8,000
active participants and 6,000 beneficiaries, so we are by
no means a young plan. Considering we must pay out
lifetime annuities and the longevity of retired individuals
is very long, we must manage our liabilities pension
with the long term in mind. There is also a management
commitment to do so. 
As for our PBO situation, we have a 269 billion yen
PBO, including one-time payouts and annuities. Against
this, we had pension assets of 160 billion yen and a
return reserve of 66 billion. We are seeing an expanded
recognized difference because of the poor economy of
the past three years, the same as anybody else, I believe,
in this area. 
Qualified pension funds differ from welfare pension
funds in that they lack an independent investment com-
mittee. Therefore, it is paramount that the number one
rule is prohibiting individual mandates, and it must be
followed. That has to be there because we follow plan
sponsor fiduciary duty. The role of the sponsor must be
only to provide investment guidelines to the financial
institution and monitor the results.
As for the investment strategy, again this is some-
thing that is well known to PFA members, because we
have simply emulated what you are doing. 
We have long-term investments, portfolio diversification,
asset allocation policy decision making, and continuous
rebalancing to manage risk.
Since 2000, we have invested in nontraditional asset
classes such as private equity and real estate in order to
maintain the same risk with a higher return or the same
return with lower risk. That is what we are trying to do.
Today, I will focus on real estate-related product invest-
ments from the pension fund perspective. 
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We started by understanding how we can position
real estate with other short-term investments. However,
positioning real estate as one sub-asset class didn’t work
very well. So, starting in 2002, we started to identify real
estate as an independent asset class and included it in
the asset allocation policy decision making. By identify-
ing it as an independent asset class, it had to have a
specific return-risk target assigned to it, and we were
able to include it as an important part of our asset allo-
cation policy. At the time of reviewing asset allocation
policy each year, we review the situation. We position
real estate as having characteristics somewhere between
debt and equity. This was based upon Western research
data sources, so greater risk was weighted to adjust for
Japanese real estate. Japanese domestic real estate has
exhibited very high volatility over the past 10 years, costing
many investors in this asset class a great deal of money.
When including an asset with low liquidity, an
interim asset allocation target must be set. For example,
if this were private equity, we would not reach our tar-
get asset allocation for, say, five to six years. Our fund
identifies a midterm or interim target, and then we work
backward to take into consideration the amount of 
purchases per annum we can make to arrive at an asset
allocation policy target for a one-year period. When
beginning to invest in real estate products, I’m sure that
you are having the same problem that I had in setting
the initial targeting of the size of the fund. In asset allo-
cation policy, the decision to position real estate as an
independent asset class and target a certain weight in
the portfolio is the fundamental job of the sponsor.
Those of you who have followed this process know that
there is no impact on asset allocation policy unless we
allocate at least 5 to 10%. Any less, and the asset class
becomes solely decorative. This means an initial decision
must be made to commit to investing a certain weight.
From there on, the kind of products to choose within
real estate, be it buildings, anonymous unions, REITs,
etc.—there are several possible products. The decision 
is based on proposals from financial institutions. Suitable
ones are chosen according to the type of fund.
When it was proposed to do this in house, I divided
the investment alternatives into four major categories. 
I explained that the investments would be limited to
securitized real estate, despite describing it as invest-
ment in real estate-related products. I am sure every
company has experienced one or two failures in invest-
ing in real estate. Direct holding of real estate requires
know-how and skills of appraisal, as well as manage-
ment, all of which is very time consuming. There is a
strong reluctance to the direct holding of real estate.
Therefore, although we call it real estate, we actually
mean securitized real estate that is close to a financial
instrument. That’s our definition of real estate investment.
Real estate that is converted into financial instruments
falls under the SPC law, such as securitized products, 
J-REITs that are traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange,
and opportunity funds that take advantage of anony-
mous unions. For more than 12 months now, we have
put more than 80% into J-REIT, and we have also com-
mitted the remainder of our investments into a number
of opportunity funds, so our investment in the real
estate area has been a combination of J-REIT and oppor-
tunity fund investment.
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What are some of the issues? We are not positioned
to evaluate individual pieces of real estate and say, “We
like it, so we are going to invest.” It would be fine if the
pension asset management institutions could provide the
investment decision making, but outside publicly traded
J-REITS, this is not possible with SPCs and private funds.
In this situation, we commonly work with trust banks on
an individual basis. This means that a sponsor will have
to take on a portion of the trustee’s fiduciary duty. We
do not have expertise in-house in the area of real estate
investment, so it is very important that we know how
these trust banks can be held responsible. In this case, a
blind pool is more favorable than proposals with specif-
ic assets. We don’t want these companies to come to us
showing us pieces of real estate and asking us to make
decisions. We would rather find a reliable management
institution with proven capability and a strong perform-
ance record of real estate management. It would be much
easier to work with investing in real estate under the
management of someone reliable. Although we may not
be able to properly evaluate real estate, we can deter-
mine whether a management company is good or bad.
After deciding on a management company, the next
important decision is how we can monitor and exercise
our governance over this company and its people. When
everything is moving along well, it isn’t a problem, but
when the vacancy rate goes up or if we are asked to
invest more, how can we make sure that these people
will be on our side? The biggest issue is to identify
someone who will help us maintain the quality of these
investments. 
What is the relationship between J-REIT and the
listed company that acts as the sponsor of the J-REIT? 
J-REIT management will go through appraisal, evalua-
tion, and baseline criteria, and they have been tested 
by the capital market, so they have met the initial target.
From there on, performance will determine whether
they are bought or sold, the same as any equity. In the
case of opportunity funds, it is a long-term static contract,
so we will continue to monitor the fund manager and
ensure there are no violations of fiduciary duty. Finally,
there are certain securitized products that are sold, provided
the underlying specific asset is held over the long term.
We have not actually dealt with this one. One reason is
that governance is difficult. Of course, this type of product
has an assigned asset manager and property manager, so
their cooperation is expected. However, in most cases,
the contracts for the asset manager and property manager
are fixed for a long period of time. So even when per-
formance of these real estate management companies is
poor, the structure is such that we as a pension fund
cannot intervene. It is like being asked to trust blindly
and that is a very difficult decision to make, so we have
not gone into these kinds of securitized products.
Concerning the direction of deregulation, we believe
that it will eventually be favorable to move toward
direct holding. Currently, there is an oligopoly by the
trust banks as far as real estate products are concerned;
competition needs to be introduced, with new entrants.
If a sponsor directly holds real estate, for example, there
should be a separate contract for property and asset
management that can be agreed upon. It is going to be
more of a blanket approach, but based on that property
management contract, a third party can monitor real
estate management to ensure it is being done in line
with what we are asking them to do in the contract. 
It’s going to be much easier than the current situation
where trust banks are there at every level, and it will 
be necessary as pension funds purchase larger assets.
Japanese pension funds will look increasingly to
real estate investment, but there are many things that
need to be done within the industry. We need bench-
mark performance checking criteria. Currently, it is very
difficult to see what kind of risks exist and when we
can say the trustee made decisions responsibly. Research
related to this asset class, in other words, data concern-
ing past market movements, has not been disseminated
to funds.
I would also like to say that real estate is similar to
private equity in that they are both asset classes that
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require the exchange of information among investors. I
think that needs to be enhanced. This asset class needs
more information and that information should be shared
among sponsors related to particular forms of real estate
products since very little is publicly available. 
LEO DE BEVER
Senior Vice President, Research and
Economics, Ontario Teachers’ Pension
Plan Board
I want to tell you a little bit about
who we are, how we manage our
fund, why we use real estate, how
we hold it, how our direct strategy differs from a REIT
strategy, and how domestic real estate differs from 
foreign real estate. We take care of the defined benefit
pensions of 250,000 Ontario teachers. We manage 90%
of the assets that back those pensions internally, and by
an accident of history, we became very adept, early on
in our history, in using derivatives to change our struc-
ture. Our pensions are index-linked, meaning they go
up with inflation, and the risk of deficiency is shared 
50–50 between the two sponsors, the government and
the teachers’ federation. Of course, this was done during
a period when we thought that risk only had a return,
that it had no downside.
Managing a pension fund is a little bit like being a
doctor. You want to make sure that whatever care you
give improves the patient, and you want to limit the risk
that you inadvertently kill him. So, in risk management,
we want to focus on catastrophic risk in the plan and
that is why we focus in our risk budgeting exercise on a
value at risk type basis on the 1% worst annual outcome.
We use the historical variant of asset liability value for
risk management, and we do that to avoid having to
make assumptions about distributions and correlations. 
Our whole approach is risk based. It’s risk-return,
risk-return, and the more we do that, the more difficult
it becomes to relate what we are doing to traditional
asset policy mix. Of course, we need to be evaluated on
how well we are doing in terms of delivering short-term
return on risk, and for that purpose we still need a
benchmark, and for that you need a policy mix. Our
policy mix has three main components: equities, fixed
income, and what we call “inflation sensitive assets.”
You notice there is no reference to alternative assets.
There are alternative assets in all three categories, and
we try and use alternative assets where we think we 
can earn incremental return and put the balance of the
category into listed index assets. We overlay that whole
passive structure with active management, and then we
control the asset liability risk of the total amount. In this
case, we are saying we want to ensure that in the worst
one year in a hundred, we will not see our funding ratio
decline by more than 21%. 
What makes real estate attractive in that structure?
Well, if you have an asset class that doesn’t look like the
ones you already have, initially, any optimizer will tell
you that that is a good thing. The question then becomes:
“How much should you have? Can you have too much
of a good thing?” The nice thing about real estate is that
it is relatively uncorrelated with stocks and bonds. It does
have a return, as my colleague indicated, somewhere
between bonds and stocks. It is related to the real char-
acteristics of an economy, so if your economy is grow-
ing relatively fast, you should expect that the income
stream of real estate will grow with the economy. One
drawback is that real estate is cyclically sensitive, so
when the economy has a recession, real estate will do
relatively worse. The other nice thing, in a fund that has
liabilities that are linked to the CPI, is that real estate is
extraordinarily sensitive to inflation. The valuation of the
cash flow goes up more or less with inflation, and it is
very good at capturing unexpected inflation. In other
words, inflation, when it accelerates, will be quickly
reflected in real estate prices. 
Looking at the historical 30-year experience with a
breakdown in the various components of that equation
for Canada, you can see that on the whole, that relation-
ship seems to hold fairly well. In other words, the link
to inflation, the responsiveness to changes in inflation,
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and the link to GDP hold up. The GDP part may be
slightly overstated; real estate is location sensitive, so
you should take care that the local economy where your
real estate is located is growing relatively fast, because
some parts of an economy may grow faster than others. 
We have not picked a “NACRIEF”-type benchmark.
The reason for that is we studied the benchmark that 
is available for Canada as well as the one for the U.S.
We don’t find it particularly reliable, so we picked an
absolute return benchmark. We argue that in the long
run an economy like Canada’s is growing at about 3%.
Real estate should have an absolute return of about 
CPI plus four. We want to motivate our managers to 
find assets that can earn at least that kind of return. 
We expect that with good management we can add
value as first quartile managers, of around 2.5%. I agree
that the volatility in the asset class is somewhere in the
10% range. Again, one problem with real estate is that
since prices are not observable every day, in direct hold-
ings at least, you tend to underestimate the volatility. We
basically do that in our risk system by assuming that the
observed volatility is underestimated by a certain amount.
The kind of return we are aiming for has everything
to do with the building itself and nothing to do with the
financial engineering. We can do financial engineering
through a mortgage much easier in our fund outside of
real estate than inside. Sometimes, however, you have to
take the real estate with the mortgage, so we put the
real estate, the bricks and mortar, in the inflation sensi-
tive asset as a real return asset, and we put the fixed
income in our fixed income as a negative holding, and
we put management as part of our asset mix holding in
fixed income.
What do we hold? 
We hold mostly shopping malls and office buildings. 
I would say that the split between shopping malls and
office buildings is heavily in favor of shopping malls.
Office buildings tend to be more volatile, and hotels tend
to be more volatile still. We concentrate in large, urban
areas. In other words, we focus on high-quality real
estate, and we have stuck to Canada mostly. The U.S. is
not too bad in terms of inflation correlation with Canada,
but in our own market, we have been able to build
much higher quality real estate than in the U.S. market.
How do we hold it? Throughout most of the 1990s,
we held our real estate internally. We had an internal
manager who managed the buildings directly. We farmed
out the physical managing of the shopping malls, but we
managed the process of investment and we had partner-
ships with real estate companies. One of those real estate
companies was Cadillac Fairview. We held about 25% of
the company; then we had a disagreement with our other
partners, Goldman Sachs and Blackstone. There was one
of those clauses where “you buy me out or I buy you
out,” and we ended up buying out Goldman and Blackstone.
Now, we have a captive, 100%-owned real estate company.
We set the investment strategy. Initially, that was
quite a change. They tried to negotiate until we made 
it clear that they were now working for a pension fund
and that’s the way it was going to be. Since that time,
the relationship has become very amicable. In fact, I am
going there next week to talk to them about our strategy
for the next four or five years. We evaluate management
on their ability to generate return from bricks and mortar.
Why don’t we hold more REITs? I think the only
reason to hold REITs is that you want liquidity; we have
liabilities going out 80%, and it is nonsense to hold a large
proportion of our assets, assuming that we are going 
to have to cash them in tomorrow. There should be a
return for being a patient investor, for being a long-term
investor. I think REITs are sensitive to shifts in moods
between the stock market and the property market.
They tend to be heavily invested by private investors.
They have different motivations and, again, are very
short term in their orientation. We feel that is not the
place for us to be. The U.S. has more REITs to draw
from, so I use them as an example. If you look at 
these REITS, you can see that the volatility of the REITs
returns is much higher than the NACRIEF index. 
Even accepting that NACRIEF understates volatility to
some degree, the difference seems to be rather acute. 
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If I were a Japanese pension fund, I am not sure
that I would be eager to jump into the property market.
Why would you own foreign real estate? In principle,
there is nothing wrong with it. If you are in Canada, and
you are next to the U.S., the volatility between the two
markets is not very high, so you might go to the U.S.
However, if you go from our market to, say, Japan or to
Europe, that would be a different story. The currency
volatility becomes so large that the investment starts to
take on the characteristic of an equity, and even if you
hedge that currency exposure, you find that the CPI in
foreign markets that are far away isn’t always correlated
with your own CPI movement and that is what you
wanted real estate for in the first place. 
The same argument can be made about a develop-
ing market. We are getting a lot of proposals about
investing in emerging markets. They have better demo-
graphics, higher GDP growth, so in principle, my model
would say that is a good place to be, for real estate.
Again, however, that is more like an equity investment
than a real estate investment. You may still want to do
it, but not because it is real estate.
In summary, you want to be in real estate if you
think you have an inflation problem. You want to be 
in real estate when you think GDP growth is relatively
strong in the locale or the economy in which you are
investing. This means that over time, even in North
America and Europe, real estate will probably become
less attractive as an investment if the growth rate of
those economies starts to slow down. Then, you may
want to go to emerging markets where you have rapid
growth and where you have rapid growth in population,
but you may invite problems that may make the invest-
ment not quite as attractive. 
Discussion
YAMAGUCHI
I was in London from 1977 through 1982. In 1977, the
inflation rate was very rampant, 22%, so it was important
that you were invested in real estate. I was also in New
York from 1988 through 1994, and at that time, New York
was experiencing a real estate bubble with the Japanese
buying up as much as possible. But then in 1992, 1993,
the bubble collapsed and it was very difficult. I came
back to Japan and the very first year, I had to dispose of
properties that had lower market value than book value
because mark to market accounting was introduced at
the end of March 1998. I had to dispose of properties at
a huge loss of 90%. I have this bitter experience.
I know that there are various points and considera-
tions you have to be careful about. Real estate is a long-
term asset; it does not have sufficient liquidity, so if you’re
going to invest in real estate, you need to research 
very carefully before starting. I became involved for the
purposes of diversification, and I am just now learning. 
I was involved in New York property markets, so I know
a little something about the real estate market, but I
assume many of you are about to begin investing, so I
would like to start with some basic questions. 
Listening to the two presentations, I felt there are
very important differences among the real estate markets
of Canada, America, and Japan. Perhaps because of 
historical development, there is especially a difference 
in the stage of development amongst the markets. Our
answers may not really meet eye to eye, but it is impor-
tant to understand the differences. 
Mr. Ishida, in projecting the risk-return profile and
determining the distribution, what kind of data did you
use to ascertain the risk-return relationship? Historically,
the Japanese real estate market has been highly volatile,
and a distinct characteristic of Japanese real estate is its
high leverage ratio. People don’t really think of it as
somewhere between equity and fixed income. I think
volatility was worse than equity in the case of Japan for
the real estate market. What kind of data and statistics
did you use to come up with this sort of risk-return 
profile for the real estate market?
ISHIDA
I obtained past statistics for periods longer than 10 years
from multiple real estate index providers. Most of these
numbers take real estate value before leverage and use
a number of assumptions to calculate the return. You
have to have a considerable set of assumptions, but
index providers do provide those statistics. We used that
and also worked with some institutes to develop an
optimizer jointly.
I agree that the historical data is not of much use to
you, because when you look at domestic equity and
domestic real estate, the correlation is quite high, .9 or
above. Equity and domestic real estate assets in Japan
are very closely correlated. If you think about it, up
until the early 1990s, for listed Japanese companies,
investing in real estate was really a crucial business
activity. For my generation, the sales pitch to new
recruits in a company was the opportunity to develop
land or buildings. For Japan, Inc., investing in property
was an important source of income. The property mar-
ket data 10 years ago and the equity return correlations
were close because of that behavior of Japanese corpo-
rations. As a pension fund, you have to have forward-
looking assumptions about risk and returns. If you look
at what listed corporations are doing or financial institu-
tions are doing, you will certainly know they are not in
the property investing mode. I think eventually there
will be an appropriate level of correlation and an appro-
priate level of risk.
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YAMAGUCHI
Dr. de Bever, how do you estimate adequate risk and
return in deciding upon your investments?
DE BEVER
Our chairman went through a similar situation in the
early 1990s. When we were buying Cadillac, his experi-
ence was that real estate was a heartbreaker and you
could lose a lot of money there. That’s true, but you
never want to buy stuff when it is really high. We all
remember these calculations that said that Tokyo real
estate was so valuable that the imperial palace was
worth more than the state of California. When things get
to that level, then starting conditions do matter. That’s
true for the equity market and that’s true for the proper-
ty market. You always want to buy when nobody else
wants to buy. At the current time, there are a lot of U.S.
and Canadian markets that are starting to look more
than fairly priced because a lot of retail investors have
discovered the real estate market and there are fewer
other places to hide. 
We do have a risk history. We know what the risk
is, we know what the return is, based on what rental
rates on buildings are, so if the valuations based on that
rental stream start to get out of whack, we tend to sell a
little, and when conditions are unusually favorable, we
go the other way. Experience has taught us that over a
period of 10 or 20 years, these things even out, so given
that it is an asset class that is hard to get in and out of,
you should not get unduly excited about the bumps in
the middle.
YAMAGUCHI
I feel the difference in the history of the two countries;
the real estate index in Japan does not have enough
data for a basis. Are the Canadian indices reliable?
DE BEVER
No, they are not. There is not enough depth. Canada is
a relatively small country, not in land mass, but in popu-
lation. It has a population about the size of the state of
California. The indices are not really good, so that is
why we opted for a real return index, which is, by the
way, a very fundamentally different way to look at a
benchmark. There are two ways to look at a benchmark.
One is to make it easier to measure the manager. The
other is to evaluate what you need out of an asset class
to serve your clients. Our clients need a return that is
more than bonds and less than equity, given that the
risk is less than equity. We have opted for a benchmark
that tries to look at what the client needs, rather than
one that makes it easy to measure the manager.
YAMAGUCHI
I think there is a difference in the perceived level of 
liquidity between Canada and Japan. What are your
thoughts on liquidity, Mr. Ishida?
ISHIDA
Liquidity is not very high in the real estate market. That
was my original impression, and even after starting to
invest, not being able to invest as much money as
expected is one of my concerns. However, the market
for newly issued J-REIT is quite large; about several 
hundreds of billions of J-REITs are being issued annually.
If the J-REIT market were not as heated as it is right
now with institutional investors taking up considerable
positions, the opportunity to purchase in several billion
yen increments would be there. Whether several billion
yen in trading would be enough liquidity really depends
on the size of the pension fund. On an annual basis, we
have purchased close to 10 billion yen in J-REITs, and
by timing the market to the date of issuance, we were
able to minimize our transaction cost. Ten billion yen of
real estate may not be enough for a very large pension
fund, so whether that level of investment would gener-
ate a sufficient level of liquidity would differ, depending
on the pension fund and depending on the investment
policy. Research carried out by Nomura Real Estate, 
I believe, showed that the transaction volume of real
estate in central Tokyo is very high, even according to
international standards. This means that we have a
greater investment opportunity in real estate, even out-
side J-REITs. It is not like the domestic equity market,
where we could buy 10 billion yen tomorrow if we
wanted. The liquidity is not that high, but at least it is
different from private equity, which only trades 100 mil-
lion yen on an annual basis. I think it depends on the
size of the pension fund.
YAMAGUCHI
According to surveys of pension funds, there are con-
cerns about liquidity when investing in real estate in
Japan. This is most likely due to the small size of the
market. What about the liquidity situation in the United
States or Canada?
DE BEVER
I would reiterate that if you are going into real estate 
for liquidity, you are doing the wrong thing. It is not an
asset class where you should aspire to get in and out
like you do in private equity or listed equity. To give
you some impression of what the liquidity is like, this
year, we readjusted our portfolio and did some buying
and selling because Cadillac Fairview had acquired
some properties that we did not think fit our particular
profile. We were able to sell a billion dollars of real
estate without any serious difficulty. There is liquidity, 
if you are willing to be patient and tend to sell into 
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periods when there is a capital rate shift such as may 
be happening right now, when retail investors who lost
money in the stock market are piling into the real estate
market, with the risk that they may lose some more
money in the real estate market. There is enough liquid-
ity, but that should not be your focus. I want to state
that again. If you are buying these properties, you
should be willing to hold them for 10, 15, 20 years.
YAMAGUCHI
To hold the property for 10, 15, or 20 years may involve
running into business cycle and stock market down-
turns, contract renegotiations, and other unforeseeable
events in the future. Although investments in real estate
in Japan do not at the moment call for an exit strategy,
what kind of advice have you received from fund man-
agers, Mr. Ishida?
ISHIDA
It’s not necessarily an exit strategy, but I expect REITs 
to become the final owner of Japanese commercial real
estate, so the REITs themselves would be an exit. Of
course, there would be times when we have to sell the
REIT. We are not a very large fund; but we already own
slightly more than 1.5% of the REIT market. In fact we
own 4% of some REITs, which is something we can
achieve in equities, for example. This level of concen-
trated holdings in REITs I think would take more than 
a year to sell.
What we have to be careful about is the proposal
of the private fund. We have to have a very clear exit
strategy, and after the value increases, we should seek 
a new owner and try quickly to sell that property. This
structure has a clear end to the investment cycle. The
current real estate price and yield gap would create
opportunities for investment. The goal is to target 
properties that are undermanaged, to enter reasonable
investment with new capital and turn the property into 
a profit-generating piece of real estate. If that is the
strategy implemented, then sufficient capital gain can 
be realized with the transition of the ownership. That
would be the major aspect that we focus upon when 
we look at these private fund managers.
Private funds whose objective is to hold real estate
for the long term are the concern. As Mr. Yamaguchi
mentioned, such deals would be exposed to business
cycles. There would be good times and bad times in
terms of financing, and usually the time horizon would
be five years, so after five years, how do we refinance?
That’s something that we have to be careful about. If we
keep holding that real estate for a very long period of
time, then how are we to identify these new investors
that would take over the property eventually? At a more
realistic level, the private, anonymous-type investment
partnership that pursues the holding of real estate over 
a long period of time is not really up to an appropriate
level here in Japan. This is because asset management
fees are too high. Fees are calculated not against net
rent income, but against the value of the underlying real
estate. By applying an 80% leverage level, the initial
yield that is generated is quite high. So it may superfi-
cially seem very attractive, but the fees are too high in
these cases and you have to be very careful about that.
YAMAGUCHI
In Canada, do you have any challenges in terms of exit
strategy?
DE BEVER
We don’t think much about our exit strategies, as I said
before. The disturbing thing about this discussion is that
leverage is such a big part of your thinking and I am
not sure it should be. The basic characteristics of real
estate have to be the income that comes from the build-
ings. The reason that Cadillac Fairview, by the way, ran
into trouble as a stand-alone company was exactly that.
It was over-leveraged in the early 1990s and went bank-
rupt and then got bought by Blackstone, Goldman and
Teachers. Real estate within a pension fund is a totally
different animal, because you can separate the risk in
the real estate from the risk in the financing. Having
said that, you may be right. In a country like Japan,
unless you think that real economic growth is going to
become 2%, 3%, 4%, and unless you think that over
time you are going to have an inflation problem that
you need to cover with an investment like this, Japanese 
real estate may not fit a pension plan that needs to meet
CPI index obligations. That is a separate question. If the
model that we are using in North America is applicable,
then finding investment objects that meet those invest-
ment criteria is perfectly adequate in terms of matching
your liabilities to some degree.
YAMAGUCHI
Dr. de Bever, you use managers to manage, but initially
you invested directly. Why the change in policy, using
managers instead of doing it directly?
DE BEVER
We had our own management team, which we merged
with Cadillac when we bought the company, but you
really should think of Cadillac as our internal manager.
That’s how we treat it. We stay in very close contact. 
We communicate our investment stance quite directly.
Executives from their company sit in on our investment
strategy meetings, so they are quite aware of how we
are moving risk around in our investment program and
how they fit into that. That makes it easier. For now,
given that we had to buy all of Cadillac Fairview, we
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bought a whole lot of real estate in one big scoop, and
we probably don’t need a whole lot more for the next
little while. We want them to understand why that is
and at the same time, we want to give them the oppor-
tunity to inform our management as to why we might
be wrong, why, on a risk-reward basis, certain specific
real estate investments might still be quite useful in sup-
plementing or replacing some of our lower risk-return
strategies.
YAMAGUCHI
Mr. Ishida, how do you differentiate between good and
not-so-good managers? What is key?
ISHIDA
I think you are asking, “What are the factors that go into
manager selection?” The bulk of our investments are in
REITs. They are publicly traded, so we do not give indi-
vidual instructions. Basically, we remain passive. 
In the case of investing into private funds or deals
proposed by trust banks, those of you who may want to
start the investment should be well prepared. They are
very different from investment advisors and trust banks
that have been in the asset management business. In
other words, they are really like real estate brokers.
They speak ill of other deals, and you have to be pre-
pared for that mentality, that personality; the style is
completely different. You have to emphasize that you
are looking at real estate as a financial instrument, not
because of status value or that you are going to live
there. You are not going to use that building, so you
want to look at its competitiveness in attracting tenants
or at how well the building is managed, in order to
lower the management costs yet still attract tenants. You
have to look at the properties as a vehicle to give you
earned income. Those people will come up with ideas
and describe investments as financial vehicles, not as
real estate as such, because even within trust banks,
asset management people are very different from real
estate investment people. You have to start from there,
from the different personalities.
YAMAGUCHI
How would you determine fair value for a certain prop-
erty? Japanese pension plans don’t have expertise in
appraising value, and it is very difficult to understand
whether the price offered is fair. What do you do to
ascertain if the price is fair or not?
DE BEVER
It is actually quite simple to value the pure real estate
component, by looking at what the yield or the income
from the property is. I understand that in Japan, there
are some conflicts of interest between the people that
manage and they may be interconnected with the ones
that hold the asset. We don’t have that issue. Every year
we do an independent external valuation of one-third of
our properties, so over a period of three years, all our
properties get independently appraised. We do have a
benchmark when we sell, but we don’t really worry too
much about it. In the past, it has turned out that our
valuations were reasonably accurate. In fact, they should
be neither higher nor lower than what you realize, and
they have been within 5% of what we have carried on
our books for. 
YAMAGUCHI
What is your perspective, Mr. Ishida, on appraising
prices?
ISHIDA
If you were going to invest in individual properties, it
would be a different story, but we ourselves have not
taken direct ownership positions in properties, so it has
not been a concern of ours. If you look at the deals that
are brought to us, you find that there are no great bar-
gains, nor are they overvalued. They are more or less
fairly, adequately priced because J-REITs have been
making considerable progress in disclosing information.
For example, an office building’s unit price per square
meter is very clearly identified and established in the
capital market. J-REITs are currently the largest buyers 
of real estate, using money financed through capital
markets, so they determine prices. If you try to buy on
the cheap, then J-REITs will buy before you, and if they
choose not to buy a certain property, then you would
have to be suspicious that something may be wrong
with that property. In that sense, because J-REITs are
listed, you can reference the prices that those listed 
J-REITs trade and compare them to private real estate
prices. If you really consider appraisal value, you will
not make too many serious mistakes. I have not seen
any deals that are outrageous in pricing or any particular
bargains. Therefore, I think the actual market for real
estate operates very efficiently.
YAMAGUCHI
Do you think there is a conflict of interest in Japan?
ISHIDA
Yes, I would say so. Fees are a problem, and the various
service contracts that come attached to the real estate
investment contracts must be closely scrutinized.
Property management contracts with further subcontract-
ing contracts and all kinds of related transactions are not
necessarily transparent. You have to seek transparency;
otherwise, it is very difficult for you to make an investment.
This is not to say all transactions between interested 
parties are bad. For example, if Nippon Building Fund
Management pays Mitsui Real Estate a property manage-
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ment fee, this is not necessarily a bad arrangement; it is
a matter of performance. If you really want to have bet-
ter occupancy in a building, for example, and the fee is
really justified, then we investors should not say any-
thing critical. This is true for listed properties and for
private funds. Of course, it is not desirable to be locked
into a contract for the long term. If performance deterio-
rates, any sort of provision that allows a revision of the
contract is desirable. Of course, it is ideal if you are not
exposed to any conflicts of interest, but then you would
have to stay out of investing all together.
YAMAGUCHI
What about in Canada? Do you see conflict of interest
questions?
DE BEVER
What we pay particular attention to are the incentives
we give our managers. I know that incentive compensa-
tion is not quite as common in Japan as it is in North
America, but we evaluate our managers on their ability
to improve the long-term quality of the investments. We
have a rolling four-year evaluation horizon against a real
poor asset return. We look quite closely at whether they
cut corners to get there. Four years is short, but any longer
would be ineffective as a way to evaluate managers.
YAMAGUCHI
Product providers’ and investors’ interests are really
aligned? Is that what you are saying?
DE BEVER
Given that we hold the property directly, yes. We have
insight into everything surrounding the property, the
rent rolls, the tax rolls, any issues with the building
itself. There is no transparency issue. I would be very
reluctant, by the way, to go the blind trust route. To my
way of thinking, you are inviting a lot of governance
issues that you do not have when you know exactly
what you own. That puts the onus on you to spend a
lot of effort trying to understand the asset. For instance,
when we were talking about hedge funds, we were talk-
ing about the need for transparency. I think I would be
reluctant to say in real estate that it would be better not
to have it. I would rather hold directly, where I have
insight into everything that I own.
YAMAGUCHI
You talked about investment into shopping malls and
office buildings. I think there would be differences in
the attractiveness of these. Can you elaborate on that?
DE BEVER
The value of shopping malls is really tied to retail sales
because of the way our rental rates work; they are basi-
cally a proportion of retail sales. That is a much more
stable component of GDP than office occupancy. Office
occupancy can change for all sorts of reasons, including
technological change. For instance, if companies decide
to take their administrative offices and move them to the
suburbs and you hold downtown office towers, you’re
in trouble because all of a sudden, you may lose five or
six floors in your main building. We have gone through
consolidation of certain industries that has had the same
effect: financial services, life insurance, some of the law
firms. Of course, those are big users of office space, so
we have been reluctant to get too over-exposed to
office space unless there was a natural restriction on the
future supply. There is a tendency in almost every mar-
ket to overbuild. The moment there is a little bit of pick-
up in the economy, you start the cranes going up and
people start building office buildings again. We have
been able to avoid that temptation in our major cities so
far. The supply has kept pace, roughly, with the ability
of the economy to absorb, but I would say that about
80% of our assets are in retail because it is almost like a
bond. It ticks over 8% nominal, or 5% or 6% real with
clockwork, and that is what you are looking for in real
estate. You don’t want any problems where you can’t
predict what is going to happen next, because the struc-
tural changes in the economy are coming so rapidly.
YAMAGUCHI
Mr. Ishida, one of the problems that you touched on
was governance after investment. How do you think this
problem can be alleviated? 
ISHIDA
We are a tax-qualified pension fund, so there is a limita-
tion on what we can do. However, a pension fund could
choose to own real estate directly or contract with a
direct property manager, which would serve to increase
competition in this industry and increase transactional
transparency. This latter point especially signifies the
importance of deregulation.
With private fund contracts, the only power we can
hold over the manager is to avoid investing in the next
fund. Of course, there may be commitments that would
be required even by compromising liquidity, but if you
are only investing in real estate to hold that property,
you do not need a long-term contract. A contractual sit-
uation that provides greater strength in negotiating with
the service provider to demand and get improvement is
much more favorable. I think a mechanism should be
established that allows this.
DE BEVER
Let’s say the model that we are using in North America
works reasonably well in general. Can you make the
case in Japan, that if you are pursuing a somewhat
lower real rate of growth because of different demo-
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graphics and you say, “We want a 3% real return,” if you
discount your future rental stream to 3%, do the valua-
tions of current Japanese property make sense?
YAMAGUCHI
Your question is whether we can expect an inflation-
adjusted real return of 3% from real estate related invest-
ments? 
DE BEVER
Correct. That’s what you face, right? If it doesn’t earn 3%,
why would you bother?
ISHIDA
I think it would be difficult to obtain a 3% return in real
terms. The equity risk premium for the domestic equities
alone is only slightly above 2%. Capital in Japan is very
cheap, so even the equity risk premium is very low.
When it comes to real estate, these are hard assets, 
brick and mortar assets, which are relatively easy to
understand. Can we expect a real return of 3%, which 
is currently higher than the equity risk premium? I think
this is difficult.
YAMAGUCHI
We are running out of time. To those pension funds that
would like to get started in real estate investment, what
would be your advice?
DE BEVER
I think my advice is encapsulated in what we just dis-
cussed. I think you face a really tough time justifying
real estate in your portfolio, because although you 
may not be able to earn that kind of return of 3% on
Japanese equity, I think there are probably lots of other
strategies that would get you to 3%. They would not
involve Japanese assets. Maybe that is a constraint, and
maybe that is why you are going to be forced into
Japanese real estate, by default, but if you are perfectly
free to look around the world, I think a 3% real return 
is probably not something that is too hard to find. That
would be my advice—look elsewhere!
YAMAGUCHI
How do you evaluate rising prices in North America? 
DE BEVER
I just came from Australia and it’s gotten totally ridicu-
lous there, particularly in the residential market. I saw 
a graph of how, since 1990, prices have quadrupled. 
To me that is a yellow light saying this has gone too far.
Investment managers used to be reluctant to assume that
investments were starting-point dependent. That, to me,
is ridiculous. You always try to buy low and sell high.
Market timing is part of every decision you make,
whether it is in equities or real estate. You have to pick
your spots, you have to be very careful where you
invest and you have to stay out of the very hot markets
in North America and Australia.
YAMAGUCHI
What would be your final advice to pension funds inter-
ested in real estate investment?
ISHIDA
The domestic real estate market is still developing, but
the sense of overheating is very great. Pension funds
and regional banks have, in the recent past, invested in
securitized real estate, so it is quite overheated. Those
who actually bring in the deals for investment in REITs,
for example, are sometimes criticized by us for their
very high fees, and they say, “Okay, if you don’t buy,
we will seek another buyer.” There are other buyers of
relatively high-fee REITs, which are mostly the regional
banks. The income stream is not really attractive, but
there are investors in Japan, which is a source of con-
cern for us. The yields of J-REITs, for example, because
of past rising prices, are now dwindling. If Japan is
going to follow the path of other industrialized countries
in the real estate market, then institutional investors like
pension funds would come to possess the majority of the
property in the domestic market, but this requires a very
long-term structural reform. If that becomes a reality, it
may be right for us to deal with local properties because
we understand the circumstances in which the sellers of
these properties are placed. They are not willing to sell
property because they don’t think the property is attrac-
tive or that the rental income is very good. They are at
the verge of having to sell the property they possess in
order to raise funds they need for operation. If the yield
is 3%, 4%, or 5%, nobody would want to sell, but there
is this structural change going on in the real estate mar-
ket, and the ownership structure is changing, so this
asset class may be invested in more extensively in the
future in Japan. The listed J-REITs and the real estate
companies may eventually drastically change their busi-
ness models, and this may result in an overall reform of
the real estate market. They have a high interest in pen-
sion funds as investors. I do believe, however, that this
asset class is quite attractive, despite the current market
situation. 
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Keynote Speech
N.P.  NARVEKAR 
President, Columbia Investment
Management Company, LLC
I do believe that the term “alterna-
tives” is not a particularly meaning-
ful one, but leaving that aside, I
certainly believe that alternatives are
very much worth the effort that you can put into them. 
I think that they are a necessary, if not even central, part
of generating an attractive risk-adjusted return for an
institutional investor. I believe so, because I believe in
the power of diversification of attractive, risk-adjusting
returns or, put another way, the power of diversification
of attractive sources of beta and alpha. In many ways,
although we have a large hedge fund portfolio at
Columbia, we don’t think in terms of a hedge fund port-
folio, but rather in terms of one holistic portfolio with
sources of beta and alpha. 
I am the president of Columbia Investment
Management Company. I joined about 18 months ago,
and in fact, Columbia Investment Management Company
was only formed about 15 months ago, with the single
purpose, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Columbia
University, of managing the University’s US$4.3 billion
endowment. Since I am still quite new, I can say that
many of my ideas are still in implementation form, but 
I do take comfort in the success of many leading U.S.
endowments using, by and large, similar approaches.
Our Investment Management Company, the IMC, is gov-
erned by a small board of Columbia-connected profes-
sionals in the financial, Wall Street, and buy-side world, 
a highly prominent group of six or seven individuals.
Our team itself consists of 16 people, 12 professionals.
In many ways, we are an internal fund of funds across
different groups, with the important distinction that I
believe strongly in the cross-efforts between different
groups. I think the best institutional investors are those
that can think actively across different types of strate-
gies, think very carefully about the kinds of exposures,
and about where and how one might best get an expo-
sure, be it with a hedge fund, a traditional manager, or 
a private equity manager. Like many leading U.S. endow-
ments, I have inherited at Columbia a very large expo-
sure to what might be considered alternative investments.
Roughly 40% of the endowment is in what you might
call hedge funds, another 20%, broadly defined, in private
assets or private equity. I think, over my time at Columbia,
the composition of both the hedge fund portfolio and
the private equity portfolio will change, although those
numbers themselves may not change that much. 
As an endowment, we are somewhat different than
a pension fund. One significant difference is that pension
funds, at least in the U.S., have legal liability to make
payments to the pensioners. As an endowment, we
don’t have that. However, I think it is fair to say that
that difference is somewhat superficial; if I were to tell
the University Trustees or the President of the University
that we will be making no payments to the University
this year, it would not be well received. More important,
both pension funds and endowments share a need for
generating attractive, risk-adjusted returns, dialed to
whatever appropriate risk tolerance those individual
institutions may have. 
I am going to divide my comments today into three
brief topics. First, I want to share with you some of the
basic principles under which we operate. It is hard to
talk about alternatives in the context of asset allocation
without understanding the basic principles we try to fol-
low. Secondly, I will try to talk briefly about alternatives
by sharing the framework in which we think about asset
allocation. Finally, I will share a few thoughts about
execution issues to consider in implementing a strategy,
particularly in the hedge fund arena, because it seems
so timely and so popular, and, time permitting, in the
equity arena, as well.
I divide the principles on which we operate into
two groups. There are portfolio principles and there are
also work principles. The work principles are the princi-
ples that guide the way in which we do our work and
analysis. This is a comment made by Robert Rubin, for-
mer head of Goldman Sachs and former Secretary of the
U.S. Treasury. I think this statement is an important one
for all of us to consider. His basic point is that while,
“outcomes are important, and we all know that out-
comes are important, it is critical for us to think about
the decision process, because well-thought-out decisions
can turn out poorly or poorly-thought-out decisions can
very luckily turn out well, but the best way to ensure
good, long-term outcomes is to ensure a good, long-
term decision process.” It is a mantra, which we in the
Columbia Investment Management Company try to live
by and by which I try to evaluate all my team members
and I ask my board to evaluate me. It is, in many ways,
very different from the way we as investors are trained
to think. We think only about outcomes, but I think the
process that leads to outcomes is critical as well.
Secondly, while we are all under very short term
pressures for different reasons, it is important that we
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think in the long term because as so many of the speakers
have told us today, many of the results of what we are
trying to do in the alternative arena can only be evaluated
and achieved over a significant number of years. For
any investment in a strategy or even in a manager, it is
important to have a clear investment thesis, which means
a clear definition of the investment and a clear under-
standing of the components of the return and why they
should exist. Why has there been a return to this process
in the past? What inefficiency is being exploited, who is
paying for that, and why will they continue to do so? In
that regard, I find it often very curious how in the U.S.
fundamentally driven long-short equity hedge funds are
often the most popular. I think it is understandable why
many would find them the most easy to understand, 
but at the same time, their source of alpha systematically
is not as clear as some others. Perhaps in 1999, 2000,
and even 2001, one could easily argue it was the stupid
retail investor or the stupid day trader or the cumber-
some, slow-to-move, large institutional money manager
with the hedge funds taking advantage of this. Certainly,
in the last couple of years, all you have to do is talk to
Morgan Stanley or Goldman Sachs and they will tell you
that the largest traders on both sides are hedge funds,
increasingly, and there will be winners and there will be
losers. If you look at the Columbia portfolio, we can see
increasingly single stocks that are both on the long side
of certain managers and the short side of others. I’m not
saying that long-short equity is not a good area to be in.
I’m saying that the source of systematic alpha is less clear,
and it is much more purely about talent. 
Back on the investment thesis, for any area we should
think about the risks. What could go wrong? What could
take the alpha away? Finally and most importantly, we
should think about, “What are the expected returns
going forward?” By expected returns, I generally mean
expected excess returns, excess returns over cash. Also,
what is the expected volatility and what is the expected
correlation with the rest of our portfolio? For me, it is
critical to have an intuitive sense of these matters and
then use historical analysis, as appropriate, to back up
that intuitive sense. All of this is much easier said than
done, and I can tell you that I, personally, struggle with
this continuously. 
The final work principles would be two more. One,
which one of our last speakers just mentioned, is to 
network, to speak among yourselves. Investors have a
great advantage, to be able to speak among themselves
actively. Some will speak more than others, some will
be more helpful than others, but I ask you to do your
own work, do your own analysis, have your own opin-
ion, but be willing to hear what those like you think
and how they might think differently from you. Just
because they think differently, doesn’t mean you are
wrong, but it is worth understanding why they think dif-
ferently. Finally, because quantitative analysis, as much
as I appreciate it, is limited, qualitative analysis and
qualitative thought process are very important. At the
highest level, common sense is irreplaceable. There is
no substitute for a basic dose of common sense.
There are many portfolio principles and I won’t
belabor them here. Some of the previous speakers have
already touched upon them. I mentioned earlier that 
I believe in diversification of attractive, risk-adjusted
returns, because that is one way to generate an overall,
attractive risk-adjusted return for your portfolio.
Importantly, I believe we should also express our asset
allocation, not just in terms of nominal asset allocation,
but in terms of the contribution to risk of each different
portion of the portfolio. We call that risk allocation.
Finally, we believe that prudent leverage, or 
de-leverage, can be used to tailor the risk-adjusted
return to the desired risk tolerance of our University, 
as articulated and discussed by our board. There are a
number of other principles. For example, we believe in
rebalancing. Even at the manager selection level, there
are principles. We size our allocations to managers 
differently based on what we believe is, yes, their 
contribution to risk through tracking error, but equally
importantly, through softer, qualitative metrics including
our degree of conviction, our sense of stability of the
organization, our comfort with them, the transparency,
and the liquidity. Once again, common sense plays an
important role in being an institutional investor.
If I can leave you with a few thoughts on this, asset
allocation, in my opinion, is the most important thing
that we do. I believe in diversification, as I’ve said
before. I believe, also, that we should think in terms of
risk allocation and asset allocation and that alternatives
can play a fundamental role in that—alternatives as
providers of sources of alpha. Hedge funds, private
equity, and real estate, to me, are only relevant as they
are providers of sources of alpha or in some cases, even
beta, as appropriate. Really, “alternatives,” in my mind,
is not a meaningful name, because they really are sub-
sumed into the broader sense of betas and alphas.
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Take as an example of an asset allocation (this is
not Columbia’s specific allocation, although it may be a
target toward which we move to over time), what you
see at Columbia—some of it represents what I think is 
a very common allocation for large, U.S. endowments, 
the top 5 or 10 leading U.S. endowments: a very large
hedge fund portfolio. In Columbia’s case it actually is
40% with significant allocations to private equity and
real assets. This type of illustration of asset allocation 
is marked by putting alternatives as hedge funds and
private equities as their own asset class and focusing 
on dollars invested and not risk contribution. 
You can translate that same asset allocation to a risk
allocation. I prefer this approach, because it separates
buckets of beta and alpha and it estimates total contri-
bution to total risk, rather than dollars invested, so you
can see on the right, the large number is equity beta. 
As you go clockwise around, you see other betas like
credit spreads, nominal bonds, and inflation-linked
bonds. From there, you see alpha sources, public equity
stock picking. Later, you see private equity stock picking,
credits, global markets, which is really a simple word 
for fixed-income and foreign exchange markets. All the
assumptions as to the contribution of risk come from
statistics based on the very same assumptions we talked
about earlier that are so difficult and are painful but are
important to do: expected excess return, expected
volatility, and expected correlation. Hedge funds appear
nowhere on this page. Those exposures are essentially
included in these sources of beta and alpha. You will
also notice that this shows that equities makes a very
large portion of our risk, even though it represents a
smaller portion of the dollars invested. 
What are the benefits of looking at it this way? 
I think it is a way to have an intelligent discussion about
our portfolio. If we make a change from having, for
example, a three-year duration on our bond portfolio, to
a 25-year duration on our bond portfolio, our traditional
approach does not reflect any difference, while a risk
approach would do so. I also think it is a better fit for
today’s complex portfolios of hedge funds, private equi-
ties, and other types of investments. Conceptually, this
approach is really not any different than large U.S. invest-
ment banks and banks at which I spent most of my
career. It is not different from some very sophisticated
hedge funds, with an important difference: our time
frame at Columbia is much longer. We are not concerned
about a single day VaR or a weekly VaR. We think in
longer terms, so we ask our board questions like, “What
is your tolerance for the risk that five years from now
Columbia’s endowment is worth less in real terms than
it is today?” and based on that dialogue and approach,
we build our asset allocation. By the way, I share a
number of our speakers’ concerns about VaR, and obvi-
ously it is a tool, but by no means a means to an end. 
It needs to be augmented with stress testing scenario
analysis and common sense, of course. 
There are shortfalls to this approach, to be sure. It
needs a lot of statistical inputs and a lot of assumptions.
Small changes in those assumptions can sometimes lead
to significant changes in outcome. Therefore, we don’t
believe in using this framework to create an optimal
portfolio. One of the speakers earlier in the private 
equity arena mentioned the limitations of mean variance
optimalization in the context of private equity. We would
agree that, therefore, we think about this approach
directionally. We ask ourselves the question, “What
would happen if we shifted more of our fixed-income
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risk to TIPS or what if we reduced our exposure to pub-
lic equity stock picking alpha in favor of global markets,
i.e., fixed-income and foreign exchange alpha? We think
about this directionally, rather than having a false sense
of precision in an optimalization approach.
Finally, just like “alternatives,” “hedge funds” are
not a meaningful name. Hedge funds are a distribution
vehicle. It is critical for you as investors to understand
what they do and not what they call themselves. I think
an important issue also facing you increasingly is to
understand what is most important, the manager or the
strategy. If the strategy is important, as opposed to the
manager, then be very sensitive to the issue of fees. 
If the manager is important, then the fee issue is less
important. I say this, because I think increasingly, we
are seeing some degree of commoditization of certain
hedge fund strategies. I don’t think I’m going out on a
limb when I say things like convertible arbitrage and
merger arbitrage have been highly commoditized based
on the tremendous flow of capital that will go into them
over the next few years. As you think about your pro-
grams, you may find that there are ways of accessing
credible managers to run strategies for you in that
regard, in those strategies at much lower fees. I am not
saying that convertible arbitrage or merger arbitrage will
not create good risk-adjusted returns. Instead, I am say-
ing that you may not need to pay that much for certain
items. 
Liquidity is an important thing to think about, and
others have touched on it. When you think about a
hedge fund, think about the liquidity of its assets vs. 
its liabilities. Many hedge funds have some degree of
illiquid assets. Think about the liability structure in terms
of the liquidity it gives to LPs and make sure that those,
too, do not seem mismatched. Also, think about the
relationships, and ask questions about the relationships
between a hedge fund and its prime broker, which is
another major source of financing for many hedge
funds. Many lessons were learned in 1998, and again in
the summer of 2002, by hedge funds in this regard, but
lessons that are learned are forgotten quickly, so these
are important things to think about continuously. Most
of all, as you think about a hedge fund, try to think
about the alignment of interests. This is very hard to do,
but especially when you are thinking about multistrategy
hedge funds with multiproducts, you want your money
where the General Partner has its money.
The biggest issue facing hedge funds is surely the
large inflow of funds. As an endowment, I will say, 
selfishly, that we find it very scary because we have
been such long-term investors as endowments, we are
terrified of the amount of capital that both the U.S. and
Japan can potentially place in this industry. That amount
of capital will prove to change the landscape for hedge
funds going forward. It has already done so, to some
degree. In my mind, it has the risk of polluting the align-
ment of interests, because a US$300 million hedge fund
needs good returns to pay itself well. A US$6 billion hedge
fund does not. Similarly, when a US$300 million hedge
fund turns into a US$6 billion hedge fund, it goes from
being five people, led by one very talented manager, to
50 people, and the efforts of that one talented manager
are surely diluted. I am not saying that there are no
benefits to size. Resources, access to good financing—
that’s all true, but I am saying that bigger is not always
better in the hedge fund arena, the private arena, or 
any other arena. I’m also saying that the flow of capital
into hedge funds, broadly defined, will surely erode
risk-adjusted returns over time. 
People have talked about SEC oversight, and I agree
with some of the concerns, that it has the potential to
be broad and inappropriately used. Selfishly, I think that
SEC oversight will lead to more capital coming in, so 
I don’t necessarily like that. Finally, I think we should
be concerned about being too comfortable. Realize one
thing—if the returns, the volatility, or the correlation of
any particular strategy or manager, in particular, sounds
too good to be true, it probably is. 
What I have tried to do here in a very few minutes
is just summarize and not in any way to give you a
complete picture. If I can leave you with any thoughts,
it is on some of those work principles that I shared with
you that I think are central to what we do. Alternatives
are surely not magic, but I think that a thoughtful
approach to alternatives can be an important, if not 
central, part of your efforts going forward. 




Pension Fund Association of Japan 
Thank you very much for attending
this conference and taking time out
of your very busy schedule. I would
like to thank the speakers and pan-
elists, particularly those who have come from the U.S.
and Canada, to join us. I would also like to thank all the
sponsors for making this possible, because we really
asked them to give just financial support, but they had
no sort of intervention in terms of voice.
Japanese pension funds are really facing very tough
times. For three consecutive years, the funds have seen
negative returns and even Daikohenjo and the actual
dissolution of pension funds. Probably many of you 
are not focused on the management of such assets, but
we are in this difficult situation because our manage-
ment of the assets simply was not good enough. So, in
constructing our portfolios, it is very important that we
reestablish our skills and organizational framework for
pension asset management. 
We still seem to have two extreme views. Some
people think of alternatives as a savior for the woes of
pension funds, and still others would look at it as a
world of dubious speculators. It is a very interesting
dichotomy of views. This conference was organized
from the perspective of pension funds because we
wanted to make clear what kind of impact and implica-
tions the new vehicles really have for us. If you were
able to identify just one or two interesting ideas, then
this conference will have been very successful. And if
you can take away just a hint or two in your day-to-day
management activities, as an organizer of this confer-
ence I would be more than delighted. 
Thank you very much again for your participation.
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LIST OF CORPORATE SPONSORS
AIG Global Investment Group
Alternative Investment Capital Limited  
Aoyama Realty Advisors Inc. 
Asahi Life Asset Management Co., Ltd. 
The Association for Real Estate Securitization
Asuka Asset Management, Ltd.
Barclays Global Investors
The Carlyle Group 
CDC IXIS Asset Management Japan
Cititrust and Banking Corporation 
Crédit Agricole Asset Management Japan Ltd. 
Daiwa SB Investments Ltd.  
Fuji Investment Management Co., Ltd. 
Gartmore Japan Limited
Hachibushu Capital Limited
IT Global Asset Management Co., Ltd.
JP Morgan Fleming Asset Management Group
Kennedy-Wilson Japan Co., Ltd. 
Lehman Brothers
Merrill Lynch Investment Managers 
Millea Real Estate Risk Management, Inc.
Mitsubishi Trust Bank
Mitsui Asset Trust Bank






Nomura Asset Management Co., Ltd. 
Nomura Real Estate Investment Management 
Northern Trust Global Investments
Resona Trust Bank Limited 
Seven Capital Securities Co., Ltd. 
State Street Global Advisors (Japan) Co., Ltd.  
Sumitomo Trust Bank
Tower Investment Management Co., Ltd. 
UAM (Japan) Inc. 
UBS Global Asset Management (Japan) Ltd
UBS Investment Bank  
UBS Trust Bank
UFJ Trust Bank
WestAM Private Equity Group
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